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A Reconsideration of the Doctrine of
Employer Successorship-A Step
Toward a Rational Approach
Frederick K. Slicker*
The principal role of law in the development of American
labor-management relations has been to create an atmosphere
within which the interested parties may voluntarily resolve their
differences in order to insure an uninterrupted and unimpeded
flow of commerce within society. The predominant legal difficulty has been to develop general principles that strike an equitable balance between the employer's quest for profits and the
employee's search for security. The inherent tension between
entrepreneurial prerogative and employee security is brought
into sharp focus where the identity of the employer changes
after the employees have won officially recognized collective
power to press their demands against their prior employer. The
National Labor Relations Board has developed what it calls the
doctrine of employer successorship to balance the interests of
the parties in particular disputes of this nature. An excellent
illustration of the conflicting interests involved and of the confusion accompanying the application of the doctrine is presented
by the Supreme Court's recent decision in NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, Inc.' Burns held that an employer
who won a competitive bid to assume a service contract was
obligated to recognize and bargain with the existing union where
the new employer retained a majority of the former employees
and where the union was certified as exclusive collective bargaining agent of these employees only four months prior to the
award of the contract. The Court refused, however, to hold the
new employer bound by the terms of the newly negotiated collective bargaining agreement between the union and the former
employer. This Article examines the utility and viability of the
doctrine of successorship with particular emphasis on the impact
of Burns.
I. THE EVIL TO BE REMEDIED
Before embarking on a discussion of the various criteria
*
bar.

Harvard candidate for LL.M. Degree; member of the Kansas

1. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
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utilized to determine the successorship issue, it is essential to
understand definitively the evil to which the doctrine is directed
and the nature of the problems which threaten to impede progress toward eliminating that evil. It is the ultimate goal of national labor policy to maximize both freedom of choice and economic stability for all interested parties while minimizing governmental intervention. Successorship represents one attempt
to strike an equitable balance where various legitimate, though
inherently conflicting, interests clash. The former employer asserts a property right to freely transfer his assets and rearrange
his business. The new employer seeks to achieve economic efficiency in the ongoing enterprise with the least possible labor
disruption in order to maximize profits. Both old and new employee groups seek to maximize their monetary benefits within
the framework of continued employment under favorable working conditions. The union which represents the former employee group and any competing union for the new employer, if
there is one, asserts a right to represent the new employee
complement. The existing union often won majority membership, employer recognition and contractual concessions only after
great effort and expense. Any competing union seeks to reap
the benefits of that effort. It is apparent that each of these
separate interests, though inherently contradictory, is mutually
dependent.
The present employer is rarely surprised to learn of an impending change in employer identity, since any such change is
usually the product of its extensive planning. Where any employer hardship or difficulty is anticipated, prior planning and
economic power can be asserted to eliminate the problem or diminish it to a tolerable level. If this is not possible, the employer change probably will not occur. On the other hand, the
impact of change in employer identity often occurs without prior
warning to the employees and leaves them little, if any, opportunity to plan in its wake. Such a change may be peculiarly
harsh for the individual employee, since it often is accompanied
by a reduction in pay or the loss of accumulated rights and benefits or even a loss of employment. Further, the employees' union
choice and the continued vitality of any contract negotiated in
their behalf with the employer are jeopardized by the employer
change. Even where the employee learns of an impending
change, he is largely without effective power, even through his
union representative, to bring his overwhelming interests to bear
on the employer's plans. It is this inequitable imbalance of im-

19731

EMPLOYER SUCCESSORSHIP

1053

pact which successorship is designed to redress by affording the
employee protection in such situations.
II. DETERMINATION OF SUCCESSORSHIP
A.

SuccEssoRsmP

DEFnTED

At the outset, it should be noted that nowhere in the pronouncements or legislative history2 of the national labor laws
is the problem of employer successorship specifically addressed.
The doctrine is purely a creation of the NLRB acting pursuant
to its congressional mandate to fashion principles and procedures to effectuate national labor policies and objectives. 3 In
2. The problem of employer successorship first received congressional attention in the hearings which culminated in the recent amendments to the Service Contract Act, 41 U.S.C. § 351 (1970), which specifies minimum wage and fringe benefit standards in service contracts
at government installations. Section 4 of the Act was amended to provide inter alia,
No contractor or subcontractor under a contract, which succeeds
a contract subject to this Act and under which substantially
the same services are furnished, shall pay any service employee
under such contract less than the wages and fringe benefits
provided for in a collective-bargaining agreement as a result
of arm's-length negotiations, to which such service employees
would have been entitled if they were employed under the
predecessor contract....
Pub. L. No. 92-473 (Oct. 9, 1972). This amendment was in large part
precipitated by the succession of Boeing to TWA's installation service
contract at the Kennedy Space Center in 1971. There, TWA employed
approximately 1100 employees to perform fire, guard, and janitorial
services at the government installation. These employees were represented by the Machinists under an addendum to TWA's nation-wide
collective bargaining agreement with the Machinists. This addendum
constituted a two year agreement, eight months of which remained at
the time when Boeing succeeded TWA as contractor. Boeing also
employed 270 employees in a separate unit at the space center, these
employees being engaged in mission launch operations. These employees were also represented by the Machinists. At the time of
Boeing's succession, Boeing employed only 400 of the former TWA installation service employees. In a suit for declaratory judgment
brought by Boeing, the court held that Boeing was not a successor to
TWA as it did not retain in its employ a majority of the former employees. Boeing Co. v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers,
351 F. Supp. 813 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (appeal pending before the Fifth
Circuit).
3. The first reported use of successorship came in a case which
questioned the scope of the Board's authority to issue remedial orders
against a partnership newly created by operation of law. There a
partnership engaged in a systematic scheme of interrogation and intimidation against its employees following Board certification of the
union. While unfair labor practice charges were pending before the
Board, one of the partners died and, therefore, the partnership dissolved by operation of law. In enforcing the Board's order against the
old and new partnership and the executrix of the dead partner's es-
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general terms, a new employer is held to be a successor where
there remains in existence a "substantial continuity in the identity of the employing enterprise," based on an analysis of the
totality of the circumstances from the viewpoint of the employees. 5 The fluidity of this factual determination has been
"shrouded in somewhat impressionistic approaches,"" resulting in
considerable conflict and constant confusion.
B.

RELEVANT CRITERIA

1.

Work Force Composition and Size

Numerous factors have been considered by the NLRB and
the courts to determine successorship.7 Since successorship
arose out of a desire to protect the union decision of the former
employees, it would seem that the principal criterion for finding
successorship should be the extent to which the composition of
the prior work force survived the change in employer identity.
Thus, when a majority 8 of the new work force does not consist
tate to remedy these unlawful practices, the court of appeals used the
following oft-quoted language:
It is the employing industry that is sought to be regulated and
brought within the corrective and remedial provisions of the
Act in the interest of industrial peace ....
It needs no demonstration that the strife to be averted is no less an object of legislative solicitude when contract, death, or operation of law
brings about change of ownership in the employing agency.
NLRB v. Colten, 105 F.2d 179, 183 (6th Cir. 1939). See generally Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
4. Randolph Rubber Co., 152 N.L.R.B. 496, 499 (1965).
5. NLRB v. DIT-MCO, Inc., 428 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1970); Witham
Buick, Inc., 139 N.L.R.B. 1209 (1962); Alexander Milburn Co., 78
N.L.R.B. 747 (1947).
6. International Ass'n of Machinists, Dis't Lodge 94 v. NLRB,
414 F.2d 1135, 1139 (D.C. Cir.) (concurring opinion of Leventhal, C.J.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 889 (1969).
7. The discussion that follows will focus upon the criteria used
in determining successorship for bargaining purposes. Where disagreement or divergence occurs as to successorship for other purposes, it
will be specifically noted in the present context or deferred for discussion in conjunction with the broader consideration of the use of the
doctrine in those contexts.
8. Majority rule is a central theme of national labor policy.
Thus, 'where the employee vote for the union was close, slight changes
in the composition of the work force might reverse the favorable union
decision. Once the majority has spoken, however, the union becomes
the exclusive bargaining representative for all the employees, even
those who were against the union and those who are not union members. Therefore, an examination into the union sentiment of the surviving majority would seem to be irrelevant. See Northwest Glove Co.,
74 N.L.R.B. 1697 (1947), where the union conceded that it never had a
majority membership of the new work force, but the Board held the
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of employees of the former unit, successorship should be denied,
and when such a majority of former employees does exist, successorship should be found. 10 Indeed, the Board has found successorship in only one case where such a majority did not exist,'
except where the new employer's hiring practices constituted
unfair labor practices through illegal discrimination against former union employees.1 2 In this regard, it should be observed
that the Board has never imposed a requirement upon the successor to hire the former employees merely because they were
former employees,'" but the Act does prohibit the employer from
4
discriminating against union members in its hiring techniques.1
On the other hand, the Board has occasionally found the new
employer not to be a successor even though the new work force
consisted of a majority of the former employees. 15 It is difficult
employer to be a successor bound to recognize and bargain with the
union since a majority of the new work force consisted of former employees represented by the union. See also Johnson Ready Mix Co., 142
N.L.R.B. 437 (1963), and Oilfield Maint. Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1384 (1963).
But see the dissent in Burns for a suggestion to the contrary. 406
U.S. 272, 296-310 (1972).
9. NLRB v. John Stepp's Friendly Ford, Inc., 338 F.2d 833 (9th
Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Alamo White Truck Serv., Inc., 273 F.2d 238 (5th
Cir. 1959).
10. NLRB v. Lunder Shoe Corp., 211 F.2d 284 (1st Cir. 1954); Randolph Rubber Co., 152 N.L.R.B. 496 (1965); Richard W. Kaase Co., 141
N.L.R.B. 245 (1963), enforced in part, 346 F.2d 24 (6th Cir. 1965).
11. Firchau Logging Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 1215 (1960). In Firchau the
new employer was a subcontractor of the predecessor, hiring 30 of his
62 employees from the ranks of the former unit. However, at the
time of demand for recognition by the union, the union possessed
membership cards of 43 of the 62 employees. There was a six month
seasonal break in work, but the new employer began operations within
the certification year. The Board held the new employer to be a successor, relying upon a presumption of continued majority within the
certification year.
12. K.B. & J. Young's Super Markets, Inc. v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 463
(9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841 (1971) (where the new employer hired all new employees after he had procured the discharge of
all the former employees). See also Columbus Janitor Serv., 191
N.L.R.B. No. 125, 77 L.R.R.M. 1737 (1971) (where the new employer
hired all new maintenance employees through the state employment
agency and thereafter unlawfully solicited memberships for the union
which represented its employees at its other job sites).
13. Tri State Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 408 F.2d 171 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
(Successorship denied' by the court of appeals since a majority of
former employees were not in the new unit and the evidence of discrimination was conflicting and insufficient to enter such a finding.)
See also footnote 5 of the Supreme Court's Burns decision. 406 U.S.
272, 280-81 n.5 (1972).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1970). [Future references will hereinafter be shortened to 8 (a) (3), NLRA, for example.]
15. Diamond Nat'l Corp., 133 N.L.R.B. 268 (1961) (where the new
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to reconcile these latter cases with the notion of protective continuity of employee interests, except as an indication that in
unusual cases other factors may outweigh work force composition in deciding the issue of successorship.' 0
One factor which is closely related to the composition of
the work force is its comparative size with the former employee
unit. However, prior NLRB and court decisions reveal no consistency in their application of this factor to the determination
of successorship. Thus the Board has found successorship, 17 and
denied it,'8 where the new employee complement was drastically
reduced in size. Similarly, the decisions have been both for 19
and against 20 successorship where the new work force was sigemployer reduced the size of the former unit from 245 to 200 but retained 134 former employees in essentially the same job classifications at the same plant under the same supervisors producing the same
product with the same equipment); see Lori-Ann of Miami, Inc., 137
N.L.R.B. 1099 (1962) (where the new employer retained 10 of 11 former
employees in his workforce of 11 under the direct supervision of the
former employer producing the same product, girls school uniforms).
The Board emphasized both that the new employer was a manufacturer of
uniforms assuming the risk of sales, as opposed to a mere contractor for
the making of uniforms for another at the customer's risk, and that the
removal of the new operation to a new plant 10 miles from the old
plant. The new uniforms were manufactured under the same trade
name as before. See also Lincoln Private Police, Inc., 189 N.L.R.B.
No. 103, 76 L.R.R.M. 1727 (1971) (where the new internal security service retained only 38% of the former job sites though it retained 61

former employees of its 66 employees).

Cf. Georgetown

Stainless

Mfg. Corp., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 41, 80 L.R.R.M. 1615 (1972) (where the new
employer purchased the old silk manufacturing business, modified the
plant, streamlined the equipment, changed the product from expensive
to cheap silk, and closed down one of the two plants. Even after this
consolidation and modification, the new employer's work force consisted of a majority of the former employers).
16. Tangentially, it should be observed at this point that the time
to assess successorship criteria has been held to be the time of succession. NLRB v. Armato, 199 F.2d 800 (7th Cir. 1952); Simons Engineering Co., 65 N.L.R.B. 1373 (1946). Cf. Galis Equip. Co., 194 N.L.R.B.
No. 124, 79 L.R.R.M. 1073 (1972) (where factors long after succession
were considered relevant to a determination of this issue).
17. Rohlik, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1964) (work force reduced from
150 to 9); Northwest Glove Co., 74 N.L.R.B. 1697 (1947) (work force
reduced from 105 to 25); cf. NLRB v. Geronimo Serv. Co., 467 F.2d 903
(10th Cir. 1972) (where the successor assumed only part of the former
unit but the court held the certification continued, citing Burns).
18. J-P Mfg., Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. No. 161, 79 L.R.R.M. 1216 (1972)
(work force reduced from 35 to 9); Diamond Nat'l Corp., 133 N.L.R.B.
268 (1961) (work force reduced from 245 to 200); TENNSCO, Corp.,
141 N.L.R.B. 296 (1963), rev'd on other grounds, 339 F.2d 396 (6th Cir.
1964) (work force reduced from 66 to 20).
19. Tri State Maint. Corp., 167 N.L.R.B. 933 (1967), modified, 408
F.2d 171 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
20. Cf. McGuire v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 355 F.2d 352 (2d
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nificantly larger than the former employee complement.
2. Personnel Policy
In addition to the composition of the work force, changes
which affect personnel policy formulation have been considered
controlling criteria in denying successorship in certain cases.
For example, successorship has been denied both where a small,
locally-operated business was consolidated with a large multistate operation 21 and where a national enterprise was reduced
to one of local scope.22 Successorship also has been denied where
a single business operation was split into separate competing enterprises, 23 and where a new employer consolidated into one
plant a manufacturing operation formerly carried on in separate
plants in different states.24
Seemingly as important as the formulation of personnel
policies is the execution of such policies by the employee's
direct supervisors. The retention of the same supervisors has
significantly aided in the conclusion of successorship,2 5 while
Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 988 (1966)

(drivers increased from 10 to

264 and mechanics increased from 14 to 104 where the issue was the
successor's duty to arbitrate, not to bargain).
21. Union Texas Petroleum Corp., 153 N..R.B. 849 (1965) (new
employer operated newly acquired plant as one division along with its
other 15 petrochemical plants in other states). Contra, NLRB v. Zayre
Corp., 424 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1970) (prior national discount store ad-

ministered each store separately and treated its licensees as separate

operations but the new management treated all stores on a national
basis and its licensees as a part of the employee complement of the
store). Accord, International Chemical Workers Union v. NLRB, 395
F.2d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
22. NLRB v. Alamo White Truck Serv., Inc., 273 F.2d 238 (5th
Cir. 1959). See also G.T. & E. Data Servs. Corp., 194 N.L.R.B. No. 102,
79 L.R.R.1VL 1727 (1972) (new business employed 21 computer employees
out of 3,000 employees in the former general telephone utility business).
23. Lincoln Private Police, Inc., 189 N.L.R.B. No. 103, 76 L.R.R.M.
1727 (1971); Thomas Cadillac, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 884 (1968), af'd sub
nom., International Ass'n of Machinists, Dist. Lodge 94 v. NLRB, 414
F.2d 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Sewell Mfg. Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 85 (1947). See
also B & E Supermarkets, 195 N.L.R.B. No. 67, 79 L.R.R.M. 1316 (1972).
24. Georgetown Stainless Mfg. Corp., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 41, 80
L.R.R.M. 1615 (1972).
25. Overnite Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 372 F.2d 765 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 838 (1967); Golden State Bottling Co., 187 N.L.R.B. No.
142, 76 L.R.R.M. 1868 (1971), enforced, 467 F.2d 164 (9th Cir. 1972);
Johnson Ready Mix Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 437 (1963). Contra, NLRB v. John
Stepp's Friendly Ford, Inc., 338 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Alamo
White Truck Serv., Inc., 273 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1954); J-P Mfg., Inc.,
194 N.L.R.B. No. 161, 79 L.R.R.VL 1216 (1972).
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changes in supervision have contributed to a denial of successor26
ship.
3.

Lapse in Production

Since continuity in the employing industry is the focus for
successorship, it would seem that the existence or nonexistence
of an operational break in production caused by or resulting
from a change in employer identity would significantly affect
the finding of successorship. Once again, however, no discernible pattern emerges from prior NLRB and court decisions. Generally, where no hiatus occurs the new employer is found to be
a successor, 27 though the opposite result has been reached on
a number of occasions. 28 Similarly, some significant lapse in
operations has been important where the Board has denied successorship, 29 though again, the opposite result has often obtained
even though the hiatus was of considerable length. 30
4.

Change of Product

Significant attention also has been focused upon the degree
of similarity between the old and the new product produced or
the service rendered. Once again, no clear pattern emerges at
either the Board or appellate court level. Where the product or
service remains the same, the new employer is generally found
to be a successor, 3 1 though this is not assured. 32 Where the
26. Thomas Cadillac, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 884 (1968), aff'd sub nom.,
International Ass'n of Machinists, Dist. Lodge 94 v. NLRB, 414 F.2d
1135 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Diamond Nat'l Corp., 133 N.L.R.B. 268 (1961).
See also Triangle Maint. Corp., 194 N.L.R.B. No. 85, 78 L.R.R.M. 1696
(1971).

Contra, Penn Bldg. Maint. Corp.,

195

N.L.R.B. No. 29, 79

L.R.R.M. 1416 (1972); Firchau Logging Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 1215 (1960).
27. Emerald Maint., Inc., 188 N.L.R.B. No. 139, 76 L.R.R.M. 1437
(1971), enforced in part, 464 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1972); Colony Materials,

Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 105 (1961); Alexander Milburn Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 747
(1947).

28. Tri State Maint. Corp., 167 N.L.R.B. 933 (1967), modified 408
F.2d 171 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Triumph Sales, Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. 916 (1965);
Union Texas Petroleum Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 849 (1965); Lori-Ann of Miami, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1099 (1962).
29. Georgetown Stainless Mfg. Corp., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 41, 80
L.R.R.M. 1614 (1972) (1 month). TENNSCO Corp., 141 N.L.R.B. 296
(1963), rev'd on other grounds, 339 F.2d 396 (6th Cir. 1964) (3 months);
Diamond Nat'l Corp., 133 N.L.R.B. 268 (1961) (1 month).
30. Spitzer Arkon, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. No. 24, 79 L.R.R.M. 1286
(1972)

(several months);

C.G. Conn, Ltd., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 84, 80

L.R.R.M. 1387 (1972) (4
months); Firchau Logging Co., 126 N.L.R.B.
1215 (1960) (6 months); Northwest Glove Co., 74 N.L.R.B. 1697 (1947)
(1

months).

31.

NLRB v. Armato, 199 F.2d 800 (7th Cir. 1952)

(maintenance
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product or service is changed, the new employer is unlikely to
be held a successor, 33 though again, there is authority to the contrary.3 4 Similarly, the discontinuance of a portion of the products formerly produced or the services formerly rendered," or
the addition of new products3" has resulted in inconsistent decisions.
and sale of metal products); NLRB v. Blair Quarries, Inc., 152 F.2d 25
(4th Cir. 1945) (mining); Randolph Rubber Corp., 152 N.L.R.B. 496
(1965) (manufacture of canvas and rubber shoes).
32. NLRB v. John Stepp's Friendly Ford, Inc., 338 F.2d 833 (9th
Cir. 1964) (sales and service of automobiles); Piasecki Aircraft Corp. v.
NLRB, 280 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 933 (1961)

(parts, tools, and aircraft manufacture); Lincoln Private Police, Inc.,
189 N.L.R.B. No. 103, 76 L.R.R.1VL 1727 (1971) (internal security);
Travelodge Corp., 182 N.L.R.B. 370 (1970) (motel, restaurant and bar
operation); Lori-Ann of Miami, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1099 (1962) (manufacture of girls school uniforms).
33. Georgetown Stainless Mfg. Corp., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 41, 80
L.R.R.1VL 1615 (1972) (expensive silk plant changed to manufacture of
cheap silk); J-P Mfg., Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. No. 161, 79 L.R.R.M. 1216
(1972) (manufacture of metal tools, dies, stamps, and precision equipment changed to manufacture of auto parts); Galis Equip. Co., 194
N.L.R.B. No. 124, 79 L.R.R.M. 1073 (1972) (change from 80% machine
shop and 20% metal fabrication business to the reverse percentages
with an emphasis on fabrication of underground mining equipment);
Union Texas Petroleum Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 849 (1965) (gasoline refinery changed to petro chemical manufacturing and processing plant).
34. NLRB v. DIT-MCO, Inc., 428 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1970) (manufacture of radio electronic test equipment changed to manufacture of
more sophisticated electronic equipment); NLRB v. Alamo White Truck
Serv., Inc., 273 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1959) (truck sales, parts and service
changed to service only); Syncro Machine Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 985 (1945)
(manufacture, assembly, and welding of heavy duty ship parts changed
to manufacture of high speed precision equipment, coupling, and elevator parts).
35. Successorship was denied in Davenport Insulation, Inc., 184
N.L.R.B. No. 114, 74 L.R.R.M. 1726 (1970) (one of five divisions of the
former acoustical tile business was severed); Diamond Nat'l Corp., 133
N.L.R.B. 268 (1961) (the matchbook portion of the former lumber processing business was discontinued); Sewell Mfg. Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 85
(1947) (new employer purchased 2 of 3 manufacturing plants and continued operations in same location). Successorship was found in Maintenance, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1299 (1964) (garbage and maintenance service
contract split into separate parts).
36. Successorship was denied in Triumph Sales, Inc., 154 N.L.RB.
916 (1965) (four additional stores and a gourmet food line were added
to the former retail liquor business which consisted of 7 stores). Successorship was found in C.G. Conn, Ltd., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 84, 80
L.R.R.M. 1387 (1972) (addition of several new musical instruments to
the prior business); Polytech, Inc., 186 N.L.R.B. No. 148, 75 L.I.R.M.
1491 (1970) (78% of the new employer's products were added to the
former business of manufacture of plastic products). See also NLRB v.
Zayre Corp., 424 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1970) (new products added to the
sales line of prior discount business).

1060
5.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:1051

Change of Plant Location

Changes in the location of the plant or the place where the
services were rendered is another factor in assessing continuity
in the employment relations which could significantly affect
the employees' decision regarding unionization. Where such
changes have occurred, however, the NLRB and the courts have
87
usually disregarded this factor and still found successorship,
38
though there is authority to the contrary.
6.

Changes in Internal Operations

In addition to the criteria already mentioned, the Board and
the courts have also focused on whether various internal operations of the prior employer have been altered following the
change in employer identity. Some of the alterations considered
important include those in machinery and equipment, 9 inventory, 40 work in progress, 41 methods of operation,4 2 job classifica37.

NLRB v. DIT-MCO, Inc., 428 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1970) (elec-

tronic testing equipment manufacturer moved to a new plant in same
city); American Concrete Pipe, Inc., 128 N.L.R.B. 720 (1960) (the new
employer severed 1 of 7 departments from the previous employer and
moved this portion of the business to a new location 18 miles away);
California Footwear Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 765 (1955), enforced in part sub
nom., NLRB v. Lewis, 246 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1957) (new employer moved
with predecessor's financial assistance to a new plant 15 miles away).
But see Piano Workers, Local 2549 v. W.W. Kimball Co., 333 F.2d 761
(7th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds per curiam, 379 U.S. 357 (1964) (arbitration suit where employer moved from Chicago to Indiana; arbitration ordered with regard to the issue of seniority).
38. Lincoln Private Police, Inc., 189 N.L.R.B. No. 103, 76 L.R.R.M.
1727 (1971) (internal security continued at only 38% of the former job
locations); Davenport Insulation, Inc., 184 N.L.R.B. No. 114, 74 L.R.R.M.
1726 (1970) (removal of 1 of 5 divisions of acoustical tile business to a
new plant); Lori-Ann of Miami, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1099 (1962) (girls
school uniforms manufacturer moved to new plant 10 miles away).
39. Tom-A-Hawk Transit, Inc. v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir.
1969); West Suburban Transit Lines, Inc., 158 N.L.R.B. 794 (1966);
Maintenance, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1299 (1964) (successorship found in spite
of significant equipment changes). Contra, Georgetown Stainless Mfg.

Corp., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 41, 80 L.R.R.M. 1615 (1972); Galis Equip. Co.,

194 N.L.R.B. No. 124, 79 L.R.R.M. 1073 (1972); Northwest Galvanizing
Co, 168 N.L.R.B. 26 (1967); Union Texas Petroleum Corp., 153 N.L.R.B.
849 (1965).
40. Witham Buick, Inc., 139 N.L.R.B. 1209 (1962) (successorship
found though inventory remained unchanged). Contra, Union Texas
Petroleum Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 849 (1965).
41. Syncro Machine Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 985 (1945) (successorship
found where work in progress completed). Contra, Union Texas Petroleum Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 849 (1965).

42. Ugite Gas, Inc., 126 N.L.R.B. 494 (1960); Simons Eng'r Co., 65

N.L.R.B. 1373 (1946)

(successorship found where methods of operation
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tions,43 good will, 44 trade name,45 accounts receivable," 6 customers, 47 suppliers, 48 accounting methods, 49 and methods of fi-

nancing.5 0 It appears that the courts which rely on such criteria do so by focusing undue attention upon the continuity of
the former business entity rather than by emphasizing indicia of
continuity which would affect employee union sentiment. Indeed, despite the importance of these considerations from the
management's viewpoint, it is unlikely that significant alterations in any one of the above would profoundly influence the
employees' union sentiment.5 ' If this is true, then to find such
remained the same). Contra, Firchan Logging Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 1215
(1960). But see NLRB v. Zayre Corp. 424 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1970)
(successorship found where marketing changes made); K.B. & J. Young's

Super Market, Inc. v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 841 (1971).
43. Diamond Natl Corp., 133 N.L.R.B. 268 (1961)

(successorship

found though job classification essentially unaltered); cf. Witham Buick, Inc., 139 N.L.R.B. 1209 (1962).
44. Eastland Lanes, 194 N.L.R.B. No. 149, 79 L.R.R.M. 1097 (1972)
(successorship found where good will retained).
45. NLRB v. Downtown Bakery Corp., 330 F.2d 921 (6th Cir.
1964) (successorship found where trade name retained); Polytech, Inc.,

186 N.L.R.B. No. 148, 75 L.R.R.VL 1491 (1970).

Contra, Lori-Ann of

Miami, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1099 (1962).
46. NLRB v. Tempest Shirt Mfg. Co., 285 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1960)
(successorship found where accounts receivable assumed); Herman

Loewenstein, Inc., 75 N.L.R.B. 377 (1947).
47.

Ranch-Way, Inc., 183 N.L.R.B. No. 116, 74 L.R.R.M. 1389 (1970),

enforced, 445 F.2d 625 (10th Cir. 1971), vacated and remanded per
Burns, 406 U.S. 940 (1972) (successorship where customers retained);
Randolph Rubber Co., 152 N.L.R.B. 496 (1965). Contra, Lincoln Private
Police, Inc., 189 N.L.R.B. No. 103, 76 L.R.R.M. 1727 (1971); cf. G.T. &
E. Data Serv. Corp., 194 N.L.R.B. No. 102, 79 L.R.R.M. 1033 (1972).
48. Good Foods Mfg. & Proc. Corp., 195 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 79
L.R.R.M. 1387 (1972) (successorship found where same suppliers); cf.
TENNSCO Corp., 141 N.L.R.B. 296 (1963), rev'd on other grounds, 339
F.2d 396 (6th Cir. 1964) (no successorship where suppliers different).
Contra,NLRB v. Zayre Corp., 424 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1970).
49. NLRB v. Alamo White Truck Serv., Inc., 273 F.2d 238 (5th Cir.
1959) (successorship where new accounting methods used). Contra,
Witham Buick, Inc., 139 N.L.R.B. 1209 (1962).
50. Chemrock Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. 1074 (1965) (successorship found
where same sales credit operation continued). But see NLRB v. Alamo
White Truck Serv., Inc., 273 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1959) (no successorship
where new financing methods adopted).

51. See generally Goldberg, The Labor Law Obligations of a Suc-

cessor Employer, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 735, 804-05 (1969), for a similar con-

clusion.

The possibility exists, however, that technological advance-

ments in equipment, for example, could displace members of the work
force. Job classifications frequently cause jurisdictional disputes
among various unions, and changes in customers could affect wage or
other contract rights as in the case of a driver-salesman of beer on a
commission wage scale whose route is lengthened due to added customers, thereby reducing his sales time. Thus, a total disregard for
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considerations compelling, or even persuasive, is to distort the
basic purpose and policy behind the successorship inquiry.
7.

Form of Succession

One further comment should be made regarding criteria for
determining successorship. The form of the succession, that is,
the means by which the new employer assumes operational control of the enterprise, has been consistently held to be immaterial to the analysis. 52 Thus successorship has been found where
a former partnership incorporated; 53 where a former corporation
dissolved into a partnership; 54 and where a former corporation
went through some form of corporate reorganization, such as
a merger or stock transfer. 55 Similarly, successorship has been
found where the business was leased5" or a portion assumed,5 7
where the physical assets were purchased with.5 or without 0
intangibles, and even where the acquisition agreement expressly
excluded the assumption of labor obligations. 0 In addition, successorship has been considered where a purchase was from a
creditor's committee, 61 from the bankruptcy trustee,0 2 or upon
these considerations would be as unmeritorious as an overemphasis
upon them.
52. Valleydale Packers, Inc., 162 N.L.R.B. 1486 (1967).
53. Dickey v. NLRB, 217 F.2d 652 (6th Cir. 1954); Northwest Glove
Co., 74 N.L.R.B. 1697 (1947); Simons Eng'r Co., 65 N.L.R.B. 1373 (1946).
54. NLRB v. Adel Clay Prod. Co., 134 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1943).
55. NLRB v. DIT-MCO, Inc., 428 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1970). The
court there said, "Corporate transformations of these companies represented only an internal metamorphosis, not the creation of an independent separate business .... ." Id. at 781. See John Wiley & Sons,
Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964) (involving successor arbitration);
NLRB v. Tempest Shirt Mfg. Co., 285 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1960).
56. NLRB v. Armato, 199 F.2d 800 (7th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Blair
Quarries, Inc., 152 F.2d 25 (4th Cir. 1945); Alexander Milburn Co., 78

N.L.R.B. 747 (1947).
57. American Concrete Pipe, Inc., 128 N.L.R.B. 720 (1960); Firchau
Logging Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 1215 (1960).

58. Eastland Lanes, 194 N.L.R.B. No. 149, 79 L.R.R.M. 1097 (1972);
Rohlik, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1964); Richard W. Kaase Co., 141
N.L.R.B. 245 (1963), modified, 346 F.2d 24 (6th Cir. 1965).
59. Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 186 N.L.R.B. No. 151, 76 L.R.R.M.
1597 (1970), enforced in part, 468 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1972); Avenue Meat
Center, 184 N.L.R.B. No. 94, 74 L.R.R.M. 1610 (1970); Chemrock Corp.,

151 N.L.R.B. 1074 (1965).

But see Herman Loewenstein, 75 N.L.R.B.

377 (1947).
60. Hackney Iron & Steel Co., 182 N.L.R.B. 357 (1970); Johnson
Ready Mix Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 437 (1963); Colony Materials, Inc., 130
N.L.R.B. 105 (1961); cf. United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal,
Inc., 335 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964); Herman Loewenstein, 75 N.L.R.B. 377
(1947).

61.

Georgetown Stainless Mfg. Corp., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 41, 80
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assumption of a mortgage by the predecessor.6 3 Finally, successorship findings have been entered where the old and the
new employer had absolutely no prior dealings, or where the
former employer lost his sales franchise, 64 or where he, as an
independent contractor, was discharged by his employer0 5 or lost
his contract in competitive bidding.60 These results follow from
the underlying rationale of successorship since, from the employees' viewpoint, the method of change is immaterial to
whether "the employing industry remained essentially the
same.,

67

C. Tm NEED FOR PRMICTABLE AN

UNIFORM STANDARDS

The only conclusion which emerges from this analysis of criteria found relevant to determinations of successorship is that

significant confusion, conflict, and contradiction exist. Perhaps
the most that can be said is that each case is judged on its own
unique combination of facts, the end result being instability in
the law where predictability and uniformity seem eminently
desirable. In the absence of some authoritatively elaborated,
generally applicable standards, confusion will continue to reign.
Ill. THE APPLICATIONS OF SUCCESSORSHIP
Before discussing the application of the successorship doctrine to particular labor disputes, it is essential to distinguish
pure successorship cases from what is referred to as "alter ego"
L.R.R.M. 1615 (1972).
62. NLRB v. Zayre Corp., 424 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1970); Eastland
Lanes, 194 N.L.R.B. No. 149, 79 L.R.R.M. 1097 (1972); West Suburban
Transit Lines, Inc., 158 N.L.R.B. 394 (1966). But see Triumph Sales,
Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. 916 (1965).
63. Interstate 65 Corp., 186 N.L.R.B. No. 41, 75 L.R.R.M. 1403
(1970), enforced in part,453 F.2d 269 (6th Cir. 1971).
64. Tom-A-Hawk Transit, Inc. v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir.
1969); Glenn Goulding, 165 N.L.R.B. 202 (1967).

65. S-H Food Serv., Inc., 183 N.L.R.B. No. 124, 74 L.R.R.M. 1418

(1970).

66. Westgate Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. No. 54, 80 L.R.R.M. 1128 (1972);

Penn Bldg. Maint. Corp., 195 N.L.R.B. No. 29, 79 L.R.RLM. 1416 (1972);

Geronimo Serv. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. No. 88, 78 L.R.R.M. 1696 (1971), enforced per curiam, 467 F.2d 903 (10th Cir. 1972); Columbus Janitor
Serv., 191 N.L.R.B. No. 125, 77 L.R.R.M. 1737 (1971); Emerald Maint.,
Inc., 188 N.L.R.B. No. 139, 76 L.R.R.M. 1437 (1971), enforced in part,

464 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1972); Maintenance, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1299
(1965).

But see Tri State Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 408 F.2d 171 (D.C.

Cir. 1968); NLRB v. New England Tank Indus., Inc., 302 F.2d 273 (1st
Cir. 1962); Triangle Maint. Corp., 194 N.L.R.B. No. 85, 78 L.R.R.ML
1696 (1971).
67. Valleydale Packers,Inc., 162 N.L.R.B. 1486, 1490 (1967).
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cases. The latter category includes situations in which a technical change in employer identity is merely incident to the former employer's attempt to disguise its continuance because of
that employer's union animus or an unlawful motive to avoid
the commands of national labor laws. Where the "new" employer is held to be the alter ego of the former employer, the
successor is responsible for the predecessor's labor obligations,
since the law views them as the same employer in fact.08
The successorship issue has arisen in the following contexts: (1) the survival of the union's status as exclusive bargaining agent of the former employees and the new employer's
duty to recognize and bargain with this union; (2) the Board's
power to order the new employer to remedy unfair labor practices committed under the authority of the former employer; (3)
the extent to which the new employer may be compelled to
arbitrate employee grievances, arising out of the change of employer identity, under the former employer's collective bargaining agreement; and (4) the degree to which the new employer is
bound by the substantive provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement in effect at the time of the succession.
A.

SURVIVAL OF CERTIFICATION AND THE DUTY

TO BARGAIN

A labor union acquires the officially sanctioned status of
exclusive bargaining agent of a particular group of employees
either by voluntary recognition from the employer or by certification from the NLRB. An employer is legally permitted to
voluntarily recognize the union without the compulsion of Board
certification only upon a good faith belief that the union represents a majority of the employees in question. This recognition
carries with it a presumption of union majority membership for
a reasonable time. In the absence of voluntary recognition, section 9 of the NLRA empowers the NLRB to conduct an election
upon a petition demonstrating the existence of a question of
representation affecting commerce and to certify the results
68.

Examples of alter ego cases include: NLRB v. Southport Pe-

troleum Co., 315 U.S. 100 (1942); NLRB v. Herman Brothers Pet Supply,
Inc., 325 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Ozark Hardwood Co., 282
F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1960); Dickey v. NLRB, 217 F.2d 652 (6th Cir. 1954);
NLRB v. Weirton Steel Co., 135 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1943); Associated

Trans. Co., 194 N.L.R.B. No. 12, 78 L.R.R.M. 1678 (1971); California
Footwear Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 765 (1955).
A similar result is reached
where, absent union animus, two legally separate business entities are
found to be a single operation in fact. Coast Delivery Serv., Inc.,
198 N.L.R.B. No. 146, 81 L.R.R.M. 1417 (1972); Bagel Baker's Council,
174 N.L.R.B. 622 (1969).
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thereof. A victory, for the union imposes an obligation on the

employer to recognize and bargain with the union, violation of
which is an unfair labor practice. Disregard of this obligation
raises an almost conclusive presumption of continued union majority membership for, twelve months following certification,

absent extremely unusual circumstances. 09 Thereafter, the presumption is rebuttable upon the employer's demonstration of
an honest good faith doubt as to the union's majority status.
Precedent clearly and consistently indicates that a determination of successorship carries with it the survival of the union's
certification requiring the employer to recognize and bargain
with the union. 70 Ordinarily where the employer is found to be
a successor, he is required to recognize and bargain with the
union- Similarly, a denial of successorship denies the vitality
of the certification and relieves the new employer of any obligation to the predecessor's union, absent a union showing of maExcept for
jority membership or a new Board certification.7
the absence of the twelve month presumption,72 no difference
exists between the successor's duty to the union where there
69. Ray Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954).
70. Where, as here, no essential attribute of the employment
relationship has been changed as a result of the transfer, the
certification continues with undiminished vitality to represent the will of the employees with respect to their choice of
bargaining representative, and the consequent obligation to
bargain subsists notwithstanding the change in the legal
ownership of the business enterprise.
Stonewall Cotton Mills, 80 N.L.R.B. 325, 327 (1948).
NLRB v. Geronimo Serv. Co., 467 F.2d 903 (10th Cir. 1972); NLRB
v. Lunder Shoe Corp., 211 F.2d 284 (1st Cir. 1954); Valleydale Packers,
Inc., 162 N.L.R.B. 1486 (1967); Cruse Motors, Inc., 105 N.L.R.B. 242
(1953); Southerland's Tennessee Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 1178 (1953). See
NLRB v. Armato, 199 F.2d 800 (7th Cir. 1952).
71. J-P Mfg., Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. No. 161, 79 L.R.R.M. 1216 (1972);
TENNSCO Corp., 141 N.L.R.B. 296 (1963), enforcement denied on other
grounds, 339 F.2d 396 (6th Cir. 1964); Diamond Nat'l Corp., 133 N.L.R.B.
268 (1961). Contra, Piasecki Aircraft Corp. v. NLRB, 280 F.2d 575 (3d
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 933 (1961).
For a statutory exception to the successor's duty to bargain, see
Davenport Insulation, Inc., 184 N.L.R.B. No. 114, 74 L.R.RM. 1726
(1970). In Davenport, a successor employer engaged in the construction industry did not violate the Act when it refused to bargain with
a union which had contracted with the predecessor because the union's
contract was entered into pursuant to section 8 (f) of the Act. This section relieves successors of the duty to honor a bargaining obligation
when there is no independent proof of the union's majority status and
of the successor's unlawful refusal to bargain.
72. See NLRB v. International Union of Progressive Mine Workers, 319 F.2d 428 (7th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 375 U.S. 396 (1964); NLRB v.
Auto Ventshade, Inc., 276 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1960); Rohlik, Inc., 145
N.L.R.B. 1236 (1964).
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was voluntary employer recognition by the predecessor or where
73
the certification year has passed.
Underlying the union's certification is a determination by
the Board that the employee group is an appropriate bargaining unit. Section 9(b) of the Act invests the Board with exclusive and wide discretion in this regard. Indeed, the Board's
discretion is so broad that the courts on review merely require
it to state rational reasons for the unit determination 74 and reverse only where the Board does clear violence to its congres7
sional mandate by an arbitrary or unlawful unit designation.
The guiding principle of the NLRB in questions of unit appropriateness has been a search for the existence of a community
or mutuality of employee interests. 70 Similarity in wages, duties, skills and working conditions, 77 the expressed desires of the
employees, 78 the extent of employee organization,'" and the history of collective bargaining within the plant, company or industry80 are some of the important factors considered in the Board's
exercise of its discretion in these cases.
In the past, questions of unit appropriateness have evoked
heated controversy among the parties, because this decision as a
practical matter often determines which union, if any, will win
the election. To illustrate the complexity of the problem, one
need only recall the now familiar life insurance cases where the
73. Richard W. Kaase, 141 N.L.R.B. 245 (1963), modified, 346 F.2d
24 (6th Cir. 1965).

74. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
75. NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438 (1965). See,
e.g., Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958) (The Board included nonprofessional employees in a professional unit in contravention of section 9(b), NLRA.); NLRB v. Glen Raven Knitting Mills, 235 F.2d 413
(4th Cir. 1956) (The Board looked to the extent of union organization
exclusively in making a unit determination in violation of section 9(c)
(5), NLRA.).

76. Zanetti Riverton Bus Lines, 128 N.L.R.B. 1389 (1960); Continental Baking Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 777 (1952).
77. Firestone Tire & Rubber Corp., 181 N.L.R.B. 830 (1970); Federal Electric Corp., 162 N.L.R.B. 512 (1966); Town & Country Shoes,
Inc., 101 N.L.R.B. 290 (1952).

78. Pittsburg Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146 (1941); Globe

Machine & Stamping Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 294

(1937)

(Separate elections

were ordered to determine the employee sentiment among four competing unions in one plant.)
79. Section 9 (c) (5), NLRA, precludes this being the exclusive criterion used in unit determinations. NLRB v. Moss Amber Mfg. Co.,
264 F.2d 107 (9th Cir. 1959).

Cf. NLRB v. Quaker City Life Ins. Co.,

319 F.2d 690 (4th Cir. 1963) (The court sustained the board's use of
this as one of many criteria in the unit decision.).
80.

Radio Corp. of America, 66 N.L.R.B. 162 (1946).
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question was whether a single-office unit, a state-wide unit, or
a company-wide national unit was appropriate,8 ' or the long undulating history of unit determination in the face of demands for

craft severance.8 2 These issues raise perplexing problems for the
Board, since the decision is rarely a choice between one appropriate unit and an inappropriate alternative but more often is
3
among several completely appropriate units.8
Unit determinations cause peculiar difficulties in successorship cases. Indeed, the issue has been so important that one
might conclude that once the unit determination is made, successorship itself is resolved. There is clear authority to the effect that the mere change in ownership of a plant is insufficient
to disrupt an established bargaining unit.84 This result logically follows the policy behind the factors determinative of unit
appropriateness, since the employee's mutuality of interests is
unaffected by a mere change in ownership of the plant. Equally
indicative of a lack of successorship is an alteration in employer
identity which so disrupts the prior employment relationship
that the prior unit is no longer appropriate. 85 However, to conclude that a determination of unit appropriateness ipso facto
determines successorship paints the issue with too broad a brush.
The cases in which the unit is destroyed include the troublesome situations in which the Board applies its doctrine of accretion. An accretion occurs where an employee unit is added to,
and becomes integrated or commingled with an existing unit to
such an extent that the former unit completely loses its separate
identity.86 The criteria for finding an accretion seem to closely
follow those mentioned in connection with determining an appropriate unit, including the survival of an independently identi81. NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438 (1965).
82. The various shifts in criteria are illustrated by Mallinckrodt
Chemical Works, 162 N.L.R.B. 387 (1966); National Tube Co., 76 N.L.R.B.
1199 (1948); American Can Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 1252 (1939).
83. Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409 (1950).
84. Michaud Bus Lines, Inc., 171 N.L.R.B. 193 (1968); Rinker Materials Corp., 162 N.L.R.B. 1670 (1967); New Laxton Coal Co., 134
N.L.R.B. 927 (1961). See Abodeely, Effect of Reorganization, Merger,
or Acquisition on the Appropriate Bargaining Unit, 39 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 488, 488-510 (1971); Spelfogel, Labor Liabilities in Purchases,
Acquisitions and Mergers: The NLRB's Successor and Accretion Doctrines, 21 LAB. L.J. 577 (1970).
85.

Rainbow Crafts, Inc., 190 N.L.R.B. No. 106, 77 L.R.R.M. 1288

(1971); Sewell Mfg. Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 85 (1947); Tampa Transit Lines,
Inc., 71 N.L.R.B. 742 (1946).
86. Federal Electric Corp., 167 N.L.R.B. 469

Union Gas Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 361 (1960).

(1967); Brooklyn
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fiable group of employees with a community of employee interests. 7 These problems are most perplexing where two existing,
organized employee units are integrated by the change in employer identity. Where the accretion issue is factually close,
the Board tends to deny the accretion argument in the interest
of employee free choice and in view of the serious consequences
which follow the decision in favor of an accretion. 88 The accreted employees are treated as new employees in the surviving
unit, entitled to representation by the surviving union and subject to its collective bargaining agreement, if one exists. Thus
the accreted employees lose their right to exercise free choice
in the selection of the union which represents them. This is
true even where the employee union sentiment in the surviving
unit was closely split before the addition of the accreted employees, although the new employees might upset the earlier
decision if afforded a chance to vote. Nevertheless, if an accretion exists, the presumption of continued union majority survives.
In these circumstances, the new employer faces a dilemma.
If he treats the new employees as an accretion to his existing
unit and the Board disagrees, the employer commits an unfair
labor practice by not recognizing and bargaining with the added
employee's union. On the other hand, if the employer recognizes and bargains with the new employee's union and the Board
finds an accretion, the employer has committed an unfair labor
practice by recognizing and bargaining with a union that is not
the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the
unit. Indeed, whichever course of action the employer adopts,
the opposing unions will press their viewpoints to the limit, with
the employer caught in the crossfire. One escape for the employer is provided by section 9 (b) of the Act, which permits
the Board to issue a unit clarification order upon a proper application. Alternatively, the employer may seek an election by the
employees, but normally the Board's contract bar rules 80 pre87. NLRB v. Food Employers Council, Inc., 399 F.2d 501 (9th Cir.
1968); Safeway Stores, Inc., 175 N.L.R.B. 875 (1969); Radio Corp. of
America, 127 N.L.R.B. 1563 (1960). See text accompanying notes 76-80
supra.
88. Rainbow Crafts, Inc., 190 N.L.R.B. No. 106, 77 L.R.R.M. 1288
(1971); Home Furniture Co., 182 N.L.R.B. 14 (1970) (accretion denied
where new plant 10 miles away operated separately); Melbet Jewelry
Co., 180 N.L.R.B. 107 (1969) (accretion denied despite centralized employer management of state-wide retail store chain).
89. The Board has developed a rule declining to hold an election
during the term of an existing collective bargaining contract of rea-
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vent such an election. The only other alternative is to prepare
to-defend against unfair labor practice charges.
The Board's rationale for denying accretion except upon a
strong showing of complete integration achieves the objective of
maximizing employee free choice, but only at the cost of potential employee tension. Where the accretion argument is denied,
the employer has two unions with which to bargain: the union
representing the existing unit and the union representing the
newly-added employees. Rarely is stability enhanced where employees of the same employer do substantially the same work
but under less satisfactory terms than other employees. As long
as the employees are not commingled or integrated, the potential for tension is diminished. This is common where the employer has plants in multiple locations. But requiring the complete destruction of an employee unit is far removed from a
standard which precludes accretion where there exists only partial integration. Indeed, a greater integration of employees is
the basis for a stronger accretion argument. It is the rejected
but relatively meritorious accretion case which heightens the
potential for ultimate employee dissatisfaction. The judgment
is to a large extent one of degree and requires an examination
of all the relevant circumstances. 90 The Board's rule merely opts
to place the burden of proof upon the party asserting the existence of an accretion, which in general seems best calculated to
achieve the purpose of the Act.
B.

AN UNCERTAIN HISTORY:

THE DUTY TO REMEDY PRE-EXISTING

Ui-FAm LABOR PRACTICES Am

=HE Milburn DocTINE

The doctrine of successorship not only requires the successor
to recognize and bargain with the existing union but also to
remedy unfair labor practices committed by his predecessor."'
For example, the predecessor's refusal to bargain with and to
sonable duration (presumptively 3 years) except under extraordinary
circumstances. Baggett Bulk Transport, Inc., 193 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 78
L.R.R.M. 1264 (1971); General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1962);
Stubnitz Green Spring Corp., 113 N.L.R.B. 226 (1955).

The existence of

employer good faith doubt of a union's majority on the part of the employer is not an extraordinary circumstance, even if the employer is a
successor. The contract must be signed, however, to constitute an
election bar. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 104,
80L.R.R.vL 1445 (1972).
90. See NLRB v. Food Employers Council, Inc., 399 F.2d 501 (9th
Cir. 1968); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 1011 (1963).
91. The distinction between bona fide successorship and alter ego

cases mentioned at text accompanying note 68 supra, applies with special force in this area.
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recognize a designated employee representative is in itself an unfair labor practice for which the proper remedy is a bargaining
order. Since the successor has an independent duty to bargain,
it is not surprising that it is required to remedy this type of unfair labor practice. 92 Such an order operates prospectively only,
however, and is to be distinguished from cases in which the
Board's remedial power operates retrospectively to require correction of past misconduct, such as ordering reinstatement with
back pay in a case of an unlawful discharge of an employee because of the predecessor's union animus or discrimination. Even
in this latter case, however, the NLRB has imposed the remedial
obligations of the predecessor upon the successor. The Board
does not here distinguish between successorship for bargaining
purposes (prospective only) and successorship for unfair labor
practice purposes (retrospective), but analysis indicates that
this latter class of successorship is far more restrictive than the
former.

93

The history of successorship in unfair labor practice cases
has not been consistent. The NLRB initially declined without
explanation to impose such a duty upon the lessee of an enterprise, even though the lessee retained in its employ the predecessor's supervisors who were responsible for the unlawful interrogation and threats against certain employees. The Board
there emphasized the continued existence of the predecessor and
assumed the predecessor's return to the job site at the expiration
of the lease.0 4 Three years later, in Alexander Milburn Co.,95
the Board reversed its position and held that the bona fide purchaser with knowledge of the pending unfair labor practice
charges was liable to remedy his predecessor's misconduct. The
92. Webb Tractor & Equip. Co., 181 N.L.R.B. 230 (1970), modified
per curiam sub nom. NLRB v. Inland Machinery Co., 68 CCH Lab.
Cas. 12,731 (9th Cir. 1972) (election ordered) (not reported officially).
93. See Comment, Purchaser's Liability for Predecessor's Unfair
Labor Practices-Duty to Reinstate with Back Pay, 13 VILL. L. REV. 232
(1967); Comment, Independent PurchaserHeld Responsible for Remedy-

ing Predecessor's Unfair Labor Practices, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1202 (1967).
It should be noted that there exists some prospective application even
in correcting past misconduct as when the Board orders the sucessor to
cease and desist from these unlawful practices. This remedy is predicated on finding a course of employer conduct indicating a proclivity
to continue unless restrained by the threat of contempt proceedings.
It is questionable whether this type of remedy is appropriate against a
successor when such a course of conduct does not exist.
94. South Carolina Granite Co., 58 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1944), enforced
sub nom. NLRB v. Blair Quarries, Inc., 152 F.2d 25 (4th Cir. 1945).
95. 78 N.L.R.B. 747 (1947).
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Board reasoned that (1) the new employer was the only instrument through which a remedy was possible since the former employer had ceased to exist as a viable business entity; (2) the
successor actually benefited from the unfair labor practices to
the extent they discouraged the employees in the exercise of
their section 7 rights to free choice and to organize; and (3) from
the employees' viewpoint the mere change in employer identity
gave little assurance against continued union hostility. On balance, the Board found no compelling employer interest in not
requiring the successor to remedy the unfair activities, particularly where the new employer purchased the former employer's
business with knowledge of the pending unfair labor practice
complaint.
However, the Milburn rationale was destined for quick rejection. In NLRB v. Birdsall-Stockdale Motor Co.,00 the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that the Board's remedial
authority flowed exclusively from section 10 (c) of the Act which,
though broadly empowering the Board to "take such affirmative
action... as will effectuate the policies of the Act," was on its
face limited to "parties named in the complaint." Analogously,
the court looked to Rule 65 (d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which applies to Board proceedings through section
10(b) of the Act. That rule denies injunctive relief except
against "parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants,
employees and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice" of the
hearing. The court distinguished Supreme Court authority which
enforced the Board's power to bind "successors and assigns" in
a case where the successor was found to be an alter ego of the
predecessor. 97 In the absence of similar circumstances, the court
found a lack of sufficient nexus between the former employer
and the bona fide purchaser with knowledge of the unfair labor
practice to order enforcement of the Board's remedial order.0 8
Soon thereafter, the Board reexamined its Milburn rationale and again reversed its position, concluding that it lacked statutory authority to impose its remedial authority upon a bona
fide purchaser with knowledge of the pending unfair labor practices, at least where this successor was not made a party to the
96.

208 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1953).

97. Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9 (1945). See text accompanying note 68 supra.
98. Accord, NLRB v. Lunder Shoe Corp., 211 F.2d 284 (1st Cir.
1954).
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complaint.9 9 More recently, in Perma Vinyl Corp.,1 00 the Board
revived Milburn on the grounds that its prior position was unjustified, overly restrictive and purely self-imposed, rather than
a mandate from Congress. Throughout this history of conflicting results, the Board remained steadfast to the extent that if
the successor agreed upon purchase to assume its predecessor's
labor obligations and if the successor had at least constructive
knowledge of pending unfair labor practice allegations, the
successor was jointly and severally bound to remedy this misconduct with its predecessor. 10 1
Since the rebirth of the Milburn doctrine, and for that matter throughout its history, the Board has never imposed the remedial duty upon any successor that was a bona fide purchaser
unless it at least had constructive knowledge of the existence of
unresolved employer unfair labor practices. For example, if the
complaint had resulted in the Board's adjudication and a remedial order had been issued against the predecessor at the time
of succession, this judgment would be sufficient to give the successor knowledge. 10 2 If the complaint had not been heard but
had been filed with the Board at the time of succession, its existence and the successor's opportunity to be heard as an intervenor would be constructive knowledge.' 0 3 Similarly, the successor's retention of his seller's supervisors or other top management actively involved in the commission of the alleged unfair
labor practices would be deemed by the Board to be constructive knowledge, even in the face of the successor's denial of actual knowledge.

04

The rationale for this constructive knowledge requirement
is that the knowing purchaser can modify the terms of purchase
to require indemnification from the predecessor while the inno99. Symns Grocery Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 346 (1954).

100. 164 N.L.R.B. 968 (1967), enforced sub nom., NLRB v. United
Pipe & Foundry Co., 398 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1968).
101. Emerson Electric Co., 176 N.L.R.B. 745 (1969); Liberty Electronics Corp., 143 N.L.R.B. 605 (1963).
102. Kinter Bros. Co., 172 N.L.R.B. No. 31, 69 L.R.R.M. 1107 (1968);
Alexander Milburn Co., 78 N.L.R.B 747 (1947).
103. Golden State Bottling Co., 187 N.L.R.B. No. 142, 76 L.R.R.M.
1868 (1971), enforced, 467 F.2d 164 (9th Cir. 1972). Webb Tractor &
Equip. Co., 181 N.L.R.B. 230 (1970), modified sub nom. NLRB v. Inland
Machinery Co., (68 CCH Lab. Cas. 12,731) (9th Cir. 1972) (not reported
officially).
104. Webb Tractor & Equip. Co., 181 N.L.R.B. 230 (1970). See also
Clanebach, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 341 (1968); cf. NLRB v. Blair Quarries,
Inc., 152 F.2d 25 (4th Cir. 1945).
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cent purchaser is without such a remedy. 10 5 However, successor
benefit and alleviation of employee fear against future misconduct are not affected by the successor's degree of actual or constructive knowledge of the prior illegalities. The disappearance
of the prior employer as a business entity leaves only the successor available for remedial action and this should be a significant factor in determining whether the successor should remedy
past misconduct. In any event, this criterion has been found insignificant in determining if the new employer is a successor required to remedy his predecessor's past misconduct.' 00
In addition to its insistence upon a successor with knowledge, the Board has restricted imposition of the predecessor's
remedial obligations to situations in which the successor is a
purchaser. 10 7 As indicated earlier, however, the method of succession in the bargaining context would seem irrelevant, and
successorship has been found in a variety of situations, including competitive bidding and loss of franchise,1 08 even though the
new employer had absolutely no contact with the predecessor.
Again, if successor benefit and alleviation of employee fear of
future employer misconduct are the rationales for imposing the
remedial obligations of the prior employer on the successor, it
is difficult to understand how those considerations do not exist
regardless of method of succession.
In this context, except for the means of succession, the Board
looks to the same criteria for finding successorship in the unfair
labor practice setting as in the bargaining context,10 9 even
though the underlying policies of the two are quite different.
In the bargaining context, unit continuity and retention of a majority of the former employees in the new enterprise seemed the
paramount, if not determinative, consideration.' 10 On the other
105. Perma Vinyl Corp., 164 N.L.R.B. 968 (1967), enforced sub noam.,
NLRB v. United Pipe & Foundry Co., 398 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1968).
106. Eastman Kodak Co., 194 N.L.R.B. No. 27, 78 L.R.R.M. 1569
(1971). Cf. Retail Store Employees, Local 954 v. Lane's of Findlay,
Inc., 260 F. Supp. 655 (NJM. Ohio 1966) (Suit to compel arbitration
where predecessor remained in business but successorship found.).
107. The only exception is Eastman Kodak Co., 194 N.L.R.B. No.
27, 78 L.R.R.1VL 1569 (1971), where Kodak's prior plant maintenance and
repair contractor was replaced by Kodak's newly formed, wholly-owned
subsidiary. The Board found insufficient evidence to support the contractor's employee discharges to be discriminatory but imposed upon
both Kodak and its subsidiary the obligation to remedy the contractor's
employee threats and interrogation.
108. See text accompanying notes 52-67 supra.
109.

Morgan Products, Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. No. 15, 69 L.RILK 1481

(1968).
110. See text accompanying notes 8-16 supra.
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hand, a retention of a majority of the former employees in the
new unit hardly seems relevant to remedying the illegal discharge of a particular employee. This criticism was rejected in
the only case reaching the court of appeals since Perma Vinyl,
which squarely raised the issue."' Even the Board in that case
distinguished the Perma Vinyl result by denying employee reinstatement where the new enterprise was substantially smaller
than the predecessor." 2 Thus, even though the Board has the
power to fashion broad remedies, the exercise of that power is
3
limited by equitable considerations."
C.

SUCCESSOR's DUTY TO ARBITRATE GRIEVANCES UNDER THE
PREDECESSOR'S COLLEcTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT

1. Wiley and the Imposition of Arbitration
In John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston," 4 a unanimous
Supreme Court broke new ground for the notion of employer
successorship by holding a successor obligated to arbitrate employee grievances within the framework of the predecessor's
contractual labor obligations existing at the time of succession.115
Wiley, a New York City publishing firm employing 300 unorganized employees, merged with Interscience Publishers, Inc.,
111.

We consider the remedy of requiring the successor to
"share a joint and several responsibility in the matter of back
pay" and rehiring with the predecessor to be an appropriate
remedy to "effectuate the policies of the act" in situations like
that here before the Court, but with the added circumstance
that the company maintained substantially the same workforce.
UAW Union v. NLRB, 442 F.2d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 1971) (emphasis
added).
112. Thomas Engine Corp., 179 N.L.R.B. 1029 (1970) (The unit was
reduced from 130 to 97 with the new employer hiring 90 of the former
employees.).
113. The Board will not require the successor to do the impossible.
See Riley Aeronautics Corp., 178 N.L.R.B. 495 (1969) (where the successor and the predecessor ceased to manufacture airplane parts, had
no employees, and were both bankrupt. The Board did not order reinstatement of 5 employees unlawfully discharged but did order back
pay as a creditor's claim in bankruptcy.).
114. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
115. The Wiley case evoked considerable scholarly inquiry. The
most searching of the articles were: Goldberg, The Labor Law Obligations of a Successor Employer, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 735 (1969); Patrick,
Implications of the John Wiley Case for Business Transfers, Collective
Agreements, and Arbitration,18 S. CAR. L. REV. 413 (1966); Note, Successor Employer's Duty to Arbitrate: A Reconsideration of John Wiley &
Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 82 HARv. L. REv. 418 (1968); Comment, Contractual Obligations of a Successor Employer under the Collective Bargaining Agreement of a Predecessor,113 U. PA. L. REV. 914 (1965).
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which had 80 employees, 40 of whom were represented by the
complaining union. At the time of the merger, four months remained on the existing collective bargaining agreement. Shortly
after the merger, the Interscience employees were transferred to
the Wiley plant and were to some extent integrated into the
Wiley operation. Despite discussions among all the parties, no
agreement was reached as to the impact of the merger upon

the existing contract. Prior to expiration of the contract, the
union filed suit under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act 1n 6 to compel Wiley to arbitrate disputes as to the sur-

vival of seniority rights, pension benefits, vacation and severance
pay, job security and grievance procedures, after the merger and
both during and after the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. No recognition or bargaining claim was made
by the union except to the extent required to fulfill the terms
of the contract.

At the heart of the Court's reasoning in Wiley was the
preferential position to which grievance arbitration had been
elevated in the resolution of industrial disputes. The Court's
famous Steelworkers Trilogy ' 7 was fresh in mind and deeply
implanted in the Court's notion of its duty in arbitration cases.
There the Court unequivocally enunciated a strong policy to
defer to the arbitrator, whose decisions are reversible by the
courts only when the "arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity 1 18 to the essence of the collective bargaining agreement in
question. This deference flows from the special role in labor
relations of a collective bargaining agreement which the Court
characterizes as the parties' voluntary and consensual effort to
"erect a system of self government" in the plant. Thus the resulting contract is the "common law of the shop,"'1 0 at the core
of which is the enforcement apparatus: a grievance procedure
culminating in binding arbitration. Within this framework, the
arbitrator's role is to insure the continued vitality of the shop's
common law by resolving the parties' disputes through a balancing of the parties' interests and by interpreting their collective
bargaining agreement. Arbitration thus represents a continua116. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
117. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960).
118. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593,597 (1960).
119. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S.574, 580 (1960).
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tion of the collective bargaining process with the ultimate objective of reducing industrial strife, the alternatives to which
are constant interruption of the production process through continual tests of industrial strength or constant resort to litigation
in the courts. Neither of these alternatives enhances the chance
for a viable and stable daily employment relationship.
The Court did not relate Wiley's duty to arbitrate to any specific provision in the existing contract or to the successor's express assumption of such obligations. Rather, the Court envisioned the successor's arbitral duty as arising generally from
the collective bargaining agreement and from the demands of
national labor policy. However, the asserted claims in this case
arose directly from specific language in the contract, which
Interscience would clearly have been obligated to arbitrate if it
continued to exist. As a successor employer, Wiley thus stepped
into the shoes of Interscience for the purpose of determining the
scope and content of its duty to arbitrate. Presumably, if Interscience had had no collective bargaining agreement, or had an
agreement without an arbitration clause, or had no duty to arbitrate the particular subjects in dispute under the contract, Wiley
would have been under no obligation to arbitrate either.
2.

The UncertainEffects of Wiley
a.

Contract Obligations of Nonsignator

Wiley left the law of successorship in a state of even greater
instability and confusion than existed earlier. 1 20 The Court ex120.

The arbitrator factually found that the Interscience employees

remained at their same jobs in the same plant producing the same
product until January 12, 1962, some 21/ months following the merger,
at which time they were transferred to the Wiley plant and became a
"minority accretion" to the Wiley employee unit. At that time the
union lost its status as exclusive bargaining representative and the contract ceased to be enforceable.

Interscience Encyclopedia, Inc., 55 Lab.

Arb. 210, 218 (1970). The award imposed no obligation upon Wiley to
continue severance pay or pension fund contributions, though Wiley
was held to honor seniority rights, job security provisions, and accrued
vacation benefits following merger to the time the contract ceased to be
viable. Id. at 225. The arbitrator distinguished the Board's decision in
Burns.
Prior to Wiley, traditional concepts of privity determined the successor's duty. See text accompanying note 142 infra. Occasionally,
however, an arbitrator refused to be bound by concepts of privity of
contract and held that collective bargaining agreements which contained a "successor and assigns" clause bound as a matter of contract
interpretation a bona fide purchaser with knowledge, even though the
successor was not a party to such an agreement and did not expressly
assume it. Walker Bros., 41 Lab. Arb. 844 (1963).

1973]

EMPLOYER SUCCESSORSHIP

1077

pressly refrained from judging the merits of the union's claims,
leaving this entirely to the wisdom and flexibility of the arbitral
process. Therefore, Wiley did not hold that labor duties other
than submission to arbitration fell upon the successor. However, the Court gave the arbitrator little guidance as to what criteria should be used in the interpretation of the contract against
a nonsignator. The only standard suggested by the Court is
"whether or not the merger was a possibility considered by Interscience and the Union during the negotiation of the contract."'121 The arbitrator could determine the intent of the union
and the predecessor in the event of a merger by looking to the
scope of the negotiations leading up to the contract or by examining the content of a "successors and assigns" clause in the
contract.
This approach is subject to various criticisms. The content
of the successors clause is always determined without full
knowledge of the circumstances under which a later succession
occurs; unknown are such factors as size of the respective
employee groups, the degree of integration of the former employees into any new operation, the nature of such operations,
and the union status of any employees within the new employer's existing operations. Just as these considerations seem relevant to resolving whether the new employer is a successor,
they seem equally relevant to judge the content of any labor duties imposed upon the successor through the arbitral process.
Further, just as the employees usually are not represented in
the merger negotiations, neither is the new employer present
when the former employer and the union negotiate the contract.
While the successor's interests are to some degree represented
in these negotiations, there exists considerable employer disagreement regarding where to draw the line with the union.
To the extent that subsequent merger negotiations can take account of the possible imposition of these labor duties on the successor by adjustments in purchase price or successor insistence
upon indemnification, no injury is done to the successor. But
frequently that simply is not feasible, as where the successor
and the predecessor have no contact whatsoever prior to the succession. Further, if the content of the contract controls, the interests of the employees hinge upon the union's ability to
broaden the language of the successors clause. Unless succession is an immediate possibility, the predecessor employer is not
likely to be too concerned about the scope of a successor clause
121. 376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964).
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in the face of immediate union demands for higher wages. This
permits a possible distortion in the collective bargaining process,
with the union demanding the broadest possible successor clause
without vehement resistance by the predecessor.
Thus, whatever use the arbitrator makes of the intent of the
parties to the contract, it should be recognized to be a legal fiction to impute that intent to a nonsignator. The Wiley requirement that the successor arbitrate with the union has merit in
that it presumably leads the parties to the bargaining table and
thereby minimizes industrial tension. But there seems little justification for magnifying the predecessor's intent by focusing exclusively upon it to interpret the extent to which any of its other
labor obligations fall upon the successor. Yet Wiley suggests
no other criteria by which the merits of the arbitration should
be judged.
b. Impact on Successorship Determination in Other Contexts
Wiley seems also to be an aberration in terms of the criteria
for finding successorship in other contexts. Admittedly, the
Court focused upon the existence of a "substantial continuity of
identity," a criterion apparently derived from other successorship
cases. 1 22 But it concluded that such continuity is "adequately
evidenced by the wholesale transfer of Interscience employees to
the Wiley plant, apparently without difficulty.' ' 123 The ease
with which employees are transferred to a different plant in a
different location and assimilated into a different employer complement, though certainly relevant, would surely be only one of
many factors considered for successorship in other contexts.
Standing alone, even the greatest facility possible would be insufficient to warrant a finding of successorship for bargaining
purposes. Indeed, successorship for bargaining purposes requires at least a continuation of the former unit with a majority
of the surviving employee group being former employees, neither of which was present in Wiley.
By contrast, if Wiley involved only a question of arbitration
of preexisting grievances or the amount of severance pay due
under the contract, for example, then survival of a majority of
the former employees may not be required to compel arbitration, particularly since the predecessor ceased to exist after the
122. 376 U.S. 543, 551 (1964). The Court cites Cruse Motors, Inc.,
105 N.L.R.B. 242 (1953) (resolving an issue of successorship for bargaining purposes).

123. 376 U.S. 543, 551 (1964).
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merger. However, Wiley clearly involved more than arbitration
of vested rights, since the union sought to arbitrate the continuation of substantive terms of the existing contract after the
merger and even after the expiration of the contract itself. Conceptually, even by the Court's own authority, arbitration is
merely an extension of the collective bargaining process. If the
Court would not require bargaining by the successor under the
Wiley facts, then surely the Court should not compel a mere extension thereof. This would countenance a difference in result
merely because of the forum chosen by the union to effectuate
its asserted right. Stated differently, perhaps Wiley's sweeping
silence as to other criteria of successorship is a rejection of their
relevance not only for arbitration but also for other purposes.
If that was the desired result, why did the Court cite authority
for successorship in which other criteria not only were present
but specifically determinative of the successorship issue? The
answer is to be found in the application of Wiley both by the
courts in the arbitration context and by the NLRB in other settings.
c.

Differential Terms and Conditions of Employment

One other disturbing aspect of Wiley exists in light of the
facts there presented. The Court expressly avoided evaluating
the impact of differences in employee terms and conditions of
work which would undoubtedly flow from a continuation of any
portion of the Interscience collective bargaining agreement, which
purported to advantage the employees included thereunder as
opposed to other employees in the surviving unit. Surely stability in the shop is impaired rather than enhanced by requiring integrated employees to work under different wages, 12 vacation and severance pay, and seniority and grievance procedures
124. Contra, Houston Beverage Co., Inc., 72-1 CCH LAB. Ann.
AwARDs 8232. There the arbitration award ordered a continued difference in wage rates where the former employer's contract called for
it, where both employers had contracts with the same union, and
where the contracts were substantially the same except for the wage
clause. The arbitrator cited as cases of labor stability and employee
tolerance situations where differences in wage scales existed for employees working side-by-side doing the same work if the difference
was attributable to a rational standard, such as seniority or product
output. This award is also interesting in that the only clause which
survived the change in employers was the wage clause. The arbitrator
clearly stated that no case authority compelled the conclusion that
any or all substantive terms of the contract survived just because the
new employer is a successor or because the contract contains a "successors and assigns" clause.
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(the precise issues raised by the union in Wiley) just because
some of the employees had a contract with a former employer.
The Court was willing to permit resolution of these issues by
the arbitrator under an extremely limited scope of judicial review. Deference by the Court to an arbitrator's decision is appropriate where the parties bargained for the arbitrator's award,
but it is less than persuasive where, as here, the successor was
not a party to that bargain.
3.

Wiley's Progeny

The progeny of Wiley illustrate its inherent ambiguity. In
Wackenhut Corp. v. United Plant Guard Workers, the court
stated:
[t]he specific rule which we derive from Wiley is that where
there is substantial similarity of operation and continuity of
identity of the business enterprise before and after a change in
ownership, a collective bargaining agreement containing an arbitration provision, entered into by the
predecessor employer is
binding upon the suceessor employer. 125
In Wackenhut, the new employer purchased the former internal
security partnership and retained all employees in the same job
at the same plant under the same supervision and used the same
company name, uniforms, weapons, and equipment. One of the
former partners also became a corporate director of Wackenhut.
In addition, there was substantial evidence to indicate that by
its actions Wackenhut had in fact assumed the terms of the contract, except for the union shop, wage, and dues check-off
clauses, even though there was no express assumption of the
contract by Wackenhut. It would seem that to follow this mechanical all-or-nothing view of Wiley would disregard consideration of the impact of any change in the employment relationship resulting from the alteration in employer identity. 2 However, a labor contract is a series of mutually dependent clauses
where, for example, the quantity of wages is dependent on the
125. 332 F.2d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 1964). Accord, Cloak Union v.
Senco, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 539 (D. Mass. 1970).
126. Two arbitral awards not only mechanically held the successor
bound by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement but also held
the successor bound to honor long-established past practices of the predecessor, even though such practices were not the subject of any term
in the collective bargaining agreement. Elesco Smelting Corp., 71-1
ARB § 8404 (successor must pay Thanksgiving and Christmas bonuses,
even when economic conditions of the business do not warrant it, where
20 year predecessor practice was established); Simonds Worden White
Works, 67-2 CCH LAB. ARB. AwARDs 8652 (25 year's vacation pay policy
follows the merger).
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other benefits guaranteed. Thus to permit the arbitrator to
have carte blanche authority to pick and choose which terms
survive is to allow the arbitrator to upset the delicate balance
struck by the parties when the contract was made.
The Wackenhut view of Wiley was rejected in United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal Inc., where the court ordered arbitration but declined to compel the successor, ipso facto, to assume the substantive terms of the contract, stating that the collective bargaining agreement
as an embodiment of the law of the shop, remained the basic
charter of labor relations at the Bridgeville plant after the
change in ownership. But, in the arbitration of any grievance
asserted thereunder, the arbitrator may properly give weight
to any change of circumstances created by the transfer of ownof any term or terms of
ership which may make adherence
7
that agreement inequitable.12
Reliance purchased the concrete plant in question as a going
concern in a competitive posture in compliance with an FTC divestiture order to the former employer. However, it expressly
excluded assumption of any labor obligations of its predecessor.
This view of Wiley seems more in line with the purpose and language of Wiley itself implying a presumption of contract survival, though it may permit virtually unlimited arbitrator discretion to conclude which provisions of the contract survive
to
without providing the arbitrator any guidance upon which
12 8
base his conclusion, other than a general notion of equity.
An interesting by-product of Wiley is found in Monroe
Sander Corp. v. Livingston,12 9 where the principal operated two
separate, wholly-owned subsidiaries, both engaged in the manufacture of paint, one organized and the other not. For entirely
non-discriminatory economic reasons, the principal elected to liquidate the organized plant and transfer its work to the other
subsidiary, which hired no new employees despite the increase in
work. Arbitration was ordered against the organized employer
and the principal, though not against the surviving subsidiary,
in a dispute concerning the retention of jobs covered by the contract in the surviving unorganized plant.
To date, the most formidable attack on Wiley is found in
U.S. Gypsum Co. v. United Steelworkers.'30 A lime plant and
127. 335 F.2d 891, 895 (3d Cir. 1964).
128. Accord, Retail Clerks, Local 1552 v. Lynn Drug Co., 299 F.
Supp. 1036 (S.D. Ohio 1969); Hotel Employees Int'l Union v. Joden, Inc.,
262 F. Supp. 390 (D. Mass. 1966).
129.

377 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389

U.S. 831 (1968).

130. 384 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1042 (1968).
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other business assets were purchased, the agreement expressly
excepting intangibles and the survival of any labor obligations of
the seller. U.S. Gypsum retained all but three of the former employees and continued operations without any hiatus or substantial change. U.S. Gypsum declined to recognize or bargain with
the union or to assume any obligations under the existing contract. After twenty months of dispute and during the term of the
contract, the union was decertified following a board-conducted
election. U.S. Gypsum argued that it was not a successor and that
none of the labor obligations survived by the terms of its contract
of purchase. It further argued that Wiley was poorly argued,
wrongly decided and, that if arbitration pursuant to Wiley was
ordered, it could apply only to vested employee rights which
had accrued at the time of purchase, not prospectively to any
employer-employee relationship after the purchase,' 8 ' particularly in view of the union's decertification. Rejecting these arguments, the court ordered U.S. Gypsum to arbitrate the survival
of the entire contract, especially the impact after the purchase
upon the seniority and dues check-off provisions of the contract.
The court specifically found that the survival of any contract
provisions after the union's decertification was a question for the
arbitrator rather than the court. Finally, the court deferred to
the Board the question of alleged unfair labor practices arising
out of U.S. Gypsum's refusal to recognize the union.
On the merits, the arbitrator found that U.S. Gypsum was a
successor and that the entire contract survived the sale. The
arbitrator ordered U.S. Gypsum to pay the union damages equal
to the dues check-off obligations with interest but without contribution from the employees. Finally, pursuant to a wage reopening provision in the contract, the arbitrator ordered into effect a new wage scale. In a suit to compel enforcement of the
award, the court refused to uphold those portions of the award
which ordered a new pay scale and which ordered damages without employee contribution, as these portions of the award created new rights for the union not contained in the contract.
The court, however, sustained the arbitrator's award regarding
the survival of the contract, even though two courts of appeals 8 2
131. This position finds support in International Typographical
Union, Local 21 v. San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co., 247 F. Supp.

963 (N.D. Cal. 1965). To the extent Wiley can be limited to arbitration
of vested employee rights already accrued at the time of succession,
this is analogous to the successor's duty to remedy unfair labor practices committed by his predecessor prior to succession. But on its
face, Wiley is not so limited.

132. William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc. v. NLRB, 441
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had refused to order the successor bound by the contract where
the issue arose in the context of the successor's duty to bargain
with the union:
It is difficult to perceive how a successor employer could be
required to arbitrate claims arising on account of conduct after
its take over in alleged violation of the agreement without, of
necessity, holding
that it was bound by the terms of such
agreement. 133
In each of these cases, the respective employers claimed that
Wiley was applicable only to a merger of employers where the
former employer ceased to exist. In each case, however, the
courts refused to confine Wiley to the merger situation, holding
that its rationale applied with equal vigor to the sale of assets
cases, whether or not the former employer remained in the same
business in another location.
However, Wiley has been held inapplicable in cases where
its application would result in instability rather than stability,
due to competing and conflicting union claims. In McGuire v.
Humble Oil & Refining Co.,' 3 4 a portion of a small local coal
and fuel oil delivery company was sold to Humble, a large nationally operated, fully-integrated oil company. The former employer remained in business in another location. Each employee
group was represented by a different union and each had an
existing collective bargaining agreement. Humble's employee
unit consisted of 518 employees, 260 of whom were drivers and
95 of whom were mechanics. Four of the 10 drivers and 9 of the
14 mechanics in the seller's unit were hired by Humble and fully
integrated into the Humble operation. Following the sale, Humble argued that the new employees were an accretion to the existing unit in seeking a unit clarification from the Board. The
Board agreed, expressly declining to comment on the survival
of Humble's duty to arbitrate under the predecessor's contract.
Thereafter, the court held that Humble owed no duty to arbitrate under the predecessor's contract since to find such a duty
F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Interstate 65 Corp., 453 F.2d 269 (6th
Cir. 1971).
133. United Steelworkers v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 339 F. Supp. 302,
306 (N.D. Ala. 1972). This case seems likely to be appealed, though no
record of a decision on appeal has been found. Indeed, if the view
taken herein of Burns is sound (see text accompanying notes 178-181
infra), the case will be reversed to the extent that U.S. Gypsum must
honor substantive terms of the predecessor's contract since there was a
clear manifestation by U.S. Gypsum prior to succession not to be bound
by the contract. U.S. Gypsum would be obligated to bargain, however.
Similarly, Reliance is of doubtful vitality after Burns.
134. 355 F.2d 352 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 988 (1966).
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"could be a source of endless exacerbation and conflict for all
concerned. '135 It is interesting to note that here, as in Wiley,
the employee unit significantly changed as a result of the employer shift and the former employees were by no means a significant part of the remaining employee complement. The only
apparent difference is that Humble's employees were organized
and Wiley's employees were not. Surely the law would not permit this difference to control the result, since section 7 of the
Act protects the employees' right not to organize as well as their
right to organize.
Wiley has also been distinguished and arbitration denied in
other cases where competing union claims existed. In one case,
for example, the employer consolidated two separate trucking
terminals, each represented by a different union.130 The court
found that processing grievances under either union's contract,
pending NLRB resolution of the unit question, would deprive
the employer of his required neutrality, thus forcing the employer to commit an unfair labor practice. A similar result was
reached where an organized employer purchased, free of all
claims from the trustee in bankruptcy, a corrugated box manu37
facturing business following a one and one-half month hiatus.1
In that case, 31 of 33 employees hired to staff the newly-acquired
plant had been transferred from the new employer's unionized
staff in another plant; and later, when the new operation consisted of 110 employees, only 7 were formerly employed by the
predecessor. Furthermore, the new employer's union clearly
possessed majority backing in the newly-acquired plant throughout this entire period. To be contrasted with these conflicting
union situations is a case where a wholly-owned subsidiary is
merged with its principal, with both retaining their separate
identity following the merger and both having contracts with
the same union, though the latter's contract called for higher
wages. Even though the principal expressly assumed the subsidiary's contract, arbitration was ordered to adjust the pay dif138
ferences.
Other examples where Wiley has been held inapplicable and
arbitration denied include the case where an organized em135.
136.
374 F.2d
137.

Id. at 358.
Southern Conf. of Teamsters v. Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc.,
932 (5th Cir. 1967).
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Retail Store Union, 276 F. Supp. 740

(S.D.N.Y. 1967), affd per curiam, 393 F.2d 932 (2d Cir. 1968).

138. Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Bath Marine Draftsmen Ass'n, 393
F.2d 407 (lst Cir. 1968).
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ployer's contract was asserted to require arbitration as to the
representation of a newly-acquired plant in which those employees had twice voted for no union; 13 9 where an employer purchased stock of a competitor from the trustee in bankruptcy
after all creditors, including the union, had received 10% in discharge of their debts; 140 and where a unionized drug store chain
terminated one store, only to have a competitor nonunion drug
store chain acquire and operate a new drug store out of the same
41
location but with only 3 of 14 former employees. '
After almost 10 years of experimentation with Wiley, the
outer limits of arbitral successorship remain shrouded in mystery. To date, arbitration has been ordered only in cases involving purchases, mergers, and other business consolidations. No
case ordering arbitration where successorship arose out of competitive bidding, for example, has been decided. Nevertheless,
the courts have consistently held that Wiley is not dependent
upon the means of succession. Further, Wiley seems to permit a
far more liberal view of successorship than is envisioned for
other purposes, even though the courts have been slow to implement it. Perhaps this broader view is proper because ordering arbitration is not analytically equivalent to entering a finding on the merits, though experience casts some doubt upon this
conclusion.
Finally, the strong preference for arbitration rests upon the
Court's view of arbitration as a continuation of the collective
bargaining process. Perhaps in this regard, Wiley is a rousing
success. Experience indicates that once the new employer is ordered to arbitrate a particular grievance, no further resort to official decision-makers is necessary. Interestingly enough, of all
the cases mentioned under this heading where the successor's
duty to arbitrate was challenged, only Wiley and U.S. Gjpsurn
have resulted in an arbitrator's award. Only two conclusions
are possible: Either the employer completely capitulates after
being ordered to arbitrate (which seems unlikely in view of the
time, effort, and expense involved in procuring the court's decision) or the parties resolve the controversy through the bargaining process rather than through arbitration. In any event, the
139. Local 464, Bakery Workers v. Hershey Chocolate Corp., 310 F.
Supp. 1182 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd per curiam, 433 F.2d 926 (3d Cir. 1970).
140. Eastern Freight Ways, Inc. v. Local 707, Motor Freight Drivers, 300 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), affd per curiam, 422 F.2d 351

(2d Cir. 1970).
141. Retail Store Employees, Local 954 v. Lane's of Findlay, Inc.,
260 F. Supp. 655 (N.D. Ohio 1966).
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silence of future reports memorializing the continuation of industrial strife through tests of strength in official forums seems
to be the strongest evidence available to support Wiley's rationale. On the other hand, this silence may simply mirror a lack of
trust in the arbitral process, the parties preferring their own
resolution of the dispute through bargaining to the uncertain
award of the outside arbitrator.
D.

SURVIVAL OF THE SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS IN THE COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT WITHOUT RESORT TO ARBITRATION

1.

Introduction

There are possible practical differences for the union where
an arbitrator orders the successor to comply with the substantive
provisions of its predecessor's collective bargaining agreement
as opposed to the case where the NLRB enters a similar order.
In the latter instance, this ruling would arise in the context of an
unfair labor practice hearing where the Board's holding may
carry with it a cease and desist order, violation of which could
lead to contempt proceedings. This order could significantly impinge the employer's future discretionary conduct for fear of
contravening the cease and desist order. In addition, a finding
of an employer's unfair labor practice by the NLRB, rather than
a decision by an independent arbitrator construing the collective bargaining agreement, may have a significant psychological
impact in the minds of the employees. However, the legal effect
in either case is that the new employer is bound by substantive
contract provisions which govern existing and future labor-management relations in the shop, even though the employer was
not a party to the negotiations which led to the contract.
Perhaps it is this practical, rather than legal, effect which
caused the Board to move slowly into the breach. Prior to
Wiley, the Board consistently held that the successor was not
bound by the substantive contract provisions of the predecessor
unless the successor affirmatively assumed such an obligation.' '
The successor's obligation regarding future relations was limited
to recognizing and bargaining with the predecessor's union. Following Wiley, the Board continued to follow this course,"13 consistently avoiding the apparent conflict. Thus the Board declined to consider the effect of Wiley where it held the employer
142. General Extrusion Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1165 (1958); Jolly Giant
Lumber Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 413 (1955).
143. Rohlik, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1964).

1973]

EMPLOYER SUCCESSORSHIP

1087

not to be a successor; 1 44 where the trial examiner entered no
finding in this regard in deference to the Board and the Board
affirmed without discussion of this issue;145 where the remedies
would be the same whatever the outcome of this issue; 14 where
the record was "replete with uncertainties"; 147 and where the
Board concluded it was "unnecessary" to consider the issue,
since it was outside the scope of both the complaint and the record. 48 It was not until the court of appeals for the District of
Columbia remanded the issue to the Board that the NLRB was
forced to squarely confront the impact of Wiley upon the question of contract survival in the unfair labor practice context. 4 9
This remand led directly to the Board's decision in Burns.
2. NLRB v. Burns Security Services, Inc.
a. The Fact Pattern
A detailed discussion of Burns first requires some background material. From 1962 to 1967, the Wackenhut Corporation
provided internal security guards for the Ontario International
Airport near Los Angeles, California, under successive one year,
competitive bid contracts with the Lockheed Aircraft Service
Corporation. Following a consent election, 50 the NLRB certified the United Plant Guard Workers (herein UPGW) as the
exclusive bargaining representative of the Lockheed security
force, which at the time consisted of 42 guards. Two months
later, Wackenhut and UPGW entered into a three year collective
bargaining agreement, even though both parties knew that
Wackenhut's annual contract with Lockheed was about to expire. Lockheed was not a party to this collective bargaining
agreement. Thereafter, Lockheed invited competitive bids for
this security service, and UPGW gave notice to all bidders of its
recent NLRB certification and of its existing contract with Wackenhut. Lockheed awarded the contract to the William J. Burns
Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., over Wackenhut's bid. Burns provided similar security services at 30 other job sites in the greater
144: Triumph Sales, Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. 916 (1965).
145. Valleydale Packers, Inc., 162 N.L.R.B. 1486 (1967).
146. Rinker Materials Corp., 162 N.L.R.B. 1670 (1967).
147. Glenn Goulding, 165 N.L.R.B. 202 (1967).
148. Hackney Iron -&Steel Co., 167 N.L.R.B. 613 (1967).
149. International Chemical Workers Union v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 639
(D.C. Cir. 1968).
150. A consent election occurs after the employer and the union
agree under supervision of the Regional Director of the NLRB as to
the appropriateness of the unit in question, the employees eligible to
vote in the election, and the date of election.
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Los Angeles area and Burns' employees at these sites were represented under a single contract by the American Federation
of Guards (AFG). Burns freely transferred its guards from one
site to another as these guards were in a single unit in accordance
with its union contract. When Burns began operations at Lockheed, Burns' work force consisted of 15 guards transferred from
other Burns locations and 27 guards from Wackenhut's Lockheed work force. Burns required all of these new employees
to sign AFG membership cards before issuing them uniforms
at Lockheed. These employees were hired under terms and conditions of employment in accord with its AFG guards at other
sites, but wages were lower and other terms varied from those
required under the UPGW's contract with Wackenhut.
Twelve days after Burns began work under the Lockheed
contract, the UPGW demanded that Burns recognize and bargain with it and further demanded that Burns honor the UPGWWackenhut collective bargaining agreement in its entirety.
Burns refused all requests, asserting that AFG was the union
choice of a majority of the Lockheed guards on the basis of its
membership cardcount. This generated an unfair labor practice
complaint against Burns, alleging that Burns was Wackenhut's
successor employer and further alleging violations of sections
8(a) (1), 8(a) (2), and 8(a) (5) of the Act. Burns defended on
the ground that the Lockheed unit was not an appropriate bargaining unit and that it was not a successor to Wackenhut obligated to recognize, bargain with, or assume the UPGW contract.
The Board first held' 5 ' that the unit composed of guards at the
Lockheed plant was an appropriate unit though a larger unit
might also have been appropriate. The Board next held that
Burns was a successor employer and as such was obligated, as
Wackenhut would have been obligated, to recognize and bargain
with the UPGW. In addition, the Board held that the duty to
bargain carried with it the negative injunction prohibiting unilateral alteration in the terms and conditions of employment required by the Wackenhut contract. Finally, and most significantly, the NLRB held that Burns, as a successor employer, was
bound as a matter of law by the substantive provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement in effect between UPGW and
Wackenhut, even though Burns did not either expressly or im151.

William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 348,

354 (1970).

The Board also held that Burns violated 8(a) (1) and 8(a)

(2) by actively assisting AFG by soliciting membership cards from its
new employees, but this is not relevant to the remaining discussion in
this paper as this finding was not contested by the parties on appeal.
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pliedly assume such an obligation. The Board's remedial order
required Burns to make complete monetary restitution to all
employees in accordance with the UPGW contract.5 2
b. The Majority Opinion
The court of appeals affirmed the NLRB's unit determination and its successorship finding but refused to enforce the
Board's order requiring Burns to assume the substantive terms
of the Wackenhut contract. 1 5 3 The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision,154 affirmed the court of appeals by holding that Burns was
152. There were three companion cases: Hackney Iron & Steel Co.,
182 N.L.R.B. 357 (1970) (new employer is a successor whose failure to
honor the terms of the existing contract was a violation of 8(a) (5) );
Kota Division of Dura Corp., 182 N.L.R.B. 360 (1970) (union barred from
negotiation of new contract with successor where successor expressly
assumed the prior contract, even though the prior contract did not contain a "successors and assigns" clause); Travelodge Corp., 182 N.L.RIB.
370 (1970) (evidence was conflicting and contradictory; successorship
denied). As with other major cases in this area, the Board's decision in
Burns evoked considerable legal comment. See Doppelt, Successor
Companies: The NLRB Limits the Options-and Raises Some Problems, 20 DEPAuL L. REV. 176 (1971); Stern, Binding the Successor Employer to Its Predecessor's Collective Agreement Under the NLRA, 45
TEmP. L.Q. 1 (1971); Vernon, Successorship and Collective Bargaining
Agreements in Business Combinations and Acquisitions, 24 V,. L.
REv. 903 (1971); Comment, Labor Law-Successorship--The NLRB Has
a Change of Heart, 73 W. VA. L. REv. 53 (1971).
153. William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc. v. NLRB, 441
F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1971). A similar result was reached in NLRB v.
Interstate 65 Corp., 453 F.2d 269 (6th Cir. 1971).
154. NLRB v. Burns Security Services, 406 U.S. 272 (1972) (No explanation is given for the change in the name of the case as it appears
in the Board and the court of appeals decisions, and as it appears in the
United States Reports.) See Swerdlow, Freedom of Contract in Labor
Law: Burns, H.K. Porter, and Section 8(d), 51 TExAs L. REv. 1 (1972).
The author's central thesis is that Burns and H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v.
NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1969), herald the Court's reaffirmation that freedom
of contract forms an essential cornerstone of national labor policy.
This conclusion is not challenged. In Porter, the Court denied enforcement of a Board order requiring an employer to be bound by a
union dues check-off demand, after protracted and adamant employer
refusal to agree to such a provision, because such an order contravened
section 8(d). Mr. Swerdlow, however, asserts that Burns confines
Wiley to its facts, that Burns "augurs a decrease in the importance of
the successorship doctrine," and that Burns spells a dramatic shift in
successorship criteria away from an emphasis upon the number of
former employees retained to a search for "whether the new employer
is operating ... the same total business as the original employer."
51 TEXAS L. REv. at 10-20. This Article challenges those conclusions.
Indeed, Wiley seems viable as an alternative method for the factual
determination of assent by the successor; continuity of employee unit
composition as a successorship criterion seems strengthened by Burns
rather than diminished; and the notion of business entity survival is
specifically rejected by Burns on its facts.
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obligated to recognize and bargain with UPGW as soon as Burns
hired a majority of the former Lockheed guards, not as a result
of the UPGW collective bargaining agreement but because of
the recent NLRB certification and the unchanged nature of the
existing bargaining unit. The Court also held that Burns was
under no obligation to honor Wackenhut's collective bargaining
agreement, since the Board factually determined that Burns had
not assumed this obligation. Finally, the Court commented that
Burns had not unilaterally altered the terms and conditions of
employment initially offered the new guards, even though the
terms upon which they were hired differed from the terms of
their employment contracts under the Wackenhut-UPGW collective bargaining agreement. 155 The four dissenters would have
required the Court to examine the Board's unit appropriateness
determination' 5 6 and would have held that Burns was not a successor to Wackenhut and thus was not obligated either to recognize or to bargain with the UPGW.
(1)

The Duty to Bargain

Construed in the light of previously enunciated criteria,
Burns on its facts presented a relatively easy case for finding
successorship for bargaining purposes. A majority of the surviving employee complement, which remained the same size as
the former unit, consisted of former employees working in the
same jobs, rendering the same service to the same customer as
before the change in employers, and with no interruption in operations. To be sure, there was a complete change in supervision and no retention by Burns of any equipment or other assets,
either tangible or intangible, as indicia of any connection between Burns and Wackenhut. Indeed, they had no connectionthey were competitors. But these criteria, as was concluded
earlier,' 5 7 do not proximately relate to the effectuation of the
basic aim and purpose of successorship in the bargaining context: employee protection against sudden shifts in employer
155. The Court expressly recognized that the precise facts involved in Burns significantly affected the resolution on the merits.
406 U.S. 272, 274 (1972).
156. The Supreme Court denied certiorari as to the appropriateness of the Board's unit determination but granted certiorari as to the
remaining issues confronted in the enforcement of the Board's order.
404 U.S. 822 (1971).
157. See text accompanying notes 39-50 supra. Though the Court
did not expressly find Burns to be a successor, the Court inherently
embraced this concept by affirming the Board and court of appeals decisions which imposed upon Burns a duty to bargain and expressly
entered a finding of successorship.
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identity which render ineffective the employee's choice of bargaining representative and which frustrate the opportunity for
individual employee security in his personal affairs.
It could be argued that there can be no sudden unexpected
shift in employer identity where annual or periodic competitive
bidding is held and, therefore, that the policy which supports
successorship is inapplicable to such cases. Since the employees
should reasonably expect some instability in their employment
relationship because of the competitive bids, their hopes for security do not warrant official protection, even when the employees secure a collective bargaining agreement through their
elected bargaining representative. However, awareness that
some turbulence may exist does not comfort the employees when
change does occur. To protect itself, the union could insist that
the principal employer, in this case Lockheed, join in the labor
contract at least to the extent that it becomes a condition precedent to its acceptance of future bids on the particular job in
question. But Lockheed is not anxious to be thrust into the labor
policies and controversies of its contractors, and neither the contractor nor the union is in a position to insist upon such an
agreement from Lockheed. Indeed, one reason for competitive
bids is to permit a change from unsatisfactory service by the existing contract employees and management. Other attempts at
protection through successful union demands of the contractor
to include a broad successors and assigns clause in the contract
would likewise be of little comfort to the employees, at least in
the unfair labor practice context, since the Board will not look
to private agreements to define the scope of national labor obligations.15 8 The effect, therefore, of adopting the conclusion
that bargaining successorship is inapplicable in competitive bidding cases would lead to the elimination of employee organization in this entire segment of labor situations, thereby creating
a gaping hole in the protection of national labor laws. Under
the circumstances, the Court's conclusion that Burns was under
a duty to recognize and bargain with the union seems to be imminently correct.
(2) The Appropriate Unit Issue
Burns, however, presented a potentially interesting twist
158. Cruse Motors, Inc., 105 N.L.R.B. 242 (1953). The Board said:
Though the contract may create private rights and duties enforceable under other laws, so far as this statute is concerned,
the obligation to bargain is one neither created nor alterable
by private agreement.
Id. at 248.
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that the Court conveniently avoided by its limited grant of certiorari; the Court did not review the issue of unit appropriateness following the Burns' intervention. Since the Board's conclusion as to the appropriateness of the unit was not clearly erroneous and since section 9 (b) of the Act invests the Board with
broad discretion to determine the reach of bargaining units under the facts of each case, the Court apparently concluded that
it should stand without further review. It would be in error
to construe this omission as diminishing the importance of the
issue of unit appropriateness in measuring successorship, for indeed, the Court said that had the Board concluded "the Lockheed
bargaining unit was no longer an appropriate one,"'' " the results would have been different.
Even assuming the Court reviewed unit appropriateness on
the merits, the result is not likely to have been different. It
was strenuously argued that Burns' acquisition of the Lockheed
contract amounted to an accretion to its existing unit of 30 job
sites in the greater Los Angeles area. The record is silent as to
the exact provisions of the Burns collective bargaining agreement, but it is reasonable to assume that it contained a union
shop or other union security clause applicable to newly-acquired security operations, thus placing Burns in the middle of a
direct conflict between competing union claims. Of course,
Burns could have applied to the Board for a unit clarification
order, as was done in Humble. However, in view of the recent
Board certification of the Lockheed guards, a favorable result
to Burns seemed unlikely. Humble should be distinguished from
Burns not only because it was an arbitration case but also because the employees there were fully integrated into the Humble
operation, whereas in Burns there was a notable lack of integration of the Lockheed guards and the job site into the overall
Burns operation. In the absence of a complete integration, it
seems clear that the Lockheed guard unit did not completely
lose its separate identity so as to constitute an accretion to the
existing Burns unit.160
In connection with the Court's refusal to review the appropriateness of the existing unit, it found controlling the retention
by Burns of employees from that unit. Thus, "Burns' obligation
to bargain ...
stemmed from its hiring of Wackenhut's employees and from the recent election and Board certification,"''0
159.
160.
161.

406 U.S. 272, 280 (1972).
See text accompanying notes 86-90 supra.
406 U.S. 272, 278-79 (1972).
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and the "source of [Burns'] duty to bargain with the union is not
the collective-bargaining contract but the fact that it voluntarily
took over a bargaining unit that was largely intact and that had
been certified within the past year."1u 2 Indeed, Burns retained
27 of 42 former guards, a clear majority of the surviving employee complement of 42 guards. One wonders what the result
would have been had Burns hired 7 fewer former guards so that
only 20 of the 42 guards would have been from the former unit,
or if Burns would have hired 28 additional guards along with
the 27 former guards retained. In neither case would a majority of the employees in the surviving unit previously have been
represented by the existing union. 0 3 Would this slight change
in facts destroy the existing unit to such an extent that Burns
would not have been a successor and, thus, would have had no
duty to recognize or bargain with the union? Prior Board authority suggests an affirmative response,10 4 and the Court implied its concurrence. 16 5 If this is correct, the new employer
would be encouraged not to hire members of the existing unit,
which would result in greater employee anxiety and turbulence
rather than greater employee protection against sudden changes
in their employment conditions. At this point, the balance must
swing toward the protection of the new majority's section 7
rights through an election, rather than protecting a preexisting,
but now defunct, employee choice for a particular union. That
is, without the requisite majority in the new employee group,
there is no factual justification for presuming a continued majority by the existing union.
162. 406 U.S. 272, 287 (1972) (emphasis added).
163. The example is similar to Tri State Maint. Corp. v. NLRB,
408 F.2d 171 (D.C. Cir. 1968). There, following an employer's successful
bid on a one year service contract, the new employer hired 23 of the
40 former employees, though the new employer increased his employees
to 70. The new employer was held not to be a successor. The court's
language is worthy of note:
Tri State had no privity of contract with Frugal [the predeces-

sor] or Frugal's employees and it was not a "successor employ'er" that bought out the business of another.
Id. at 173 (emphasis added).

164. See text accompanying notes 8-16 supra.
165. The Court stated:
[T]he Board's determination that the bargaining unit remained
appropriate after the changeover meant that Burns would face
essentially the same labor relations 'environment as Wackenhut: it would confront the same union representing most of
the same employees in the same unit.
406 U.S. 272, 280 n.4 (emphasis added). See also quote in text at note
161 supra. In addition, surely under the relaxed standard of continuity
contained in Wiley where only 40 of the 380 employees were in the
former unit this would have been of little moment.
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The Timing Issue

A different though related issue in the context of unit composition is raised by the issue of timing. The Court stated that
"Burns' obligation to bargain with the union did not mature
Suppose that at the
until it had selected its force of guards."'u0
time operations began, Burns hired an insufficient number of
former employees to constitute a majority in the surviving employee complement, so that presumably it would owe no obligation to bargain with the union. A short time later, Burns hired
a sufficient number of additional former employees, either as
additional guards or as replacements for unsatisfactory guards
initially hired, to constitute a clear majority. Does Burns now
have a duty to bargain where no such duty existed at the time
it began operations? An affirmative answer imperils the section
7 rights of those in the unit at the time when operations began.
If they must await future contingencies in the employer's hiring
policies to organize for bargaining, then their rights may be effectively denied altogether. On the other hand, a negative answer creates an easy opportunity for employer avoidance of the
successorship obligations. On balance, it seems that duties arising out of successorship should be determined at the time of
succession, regardless of future contingencies. There is little
logic in permitting future uncertain contingencies to cloud immediate objectives. If abuse of this technique is detected, the
NLRB's ingenuity and remedial powers are sufficient to meet
the challenge. 167
A logical by-product of the Court's resolution of the timing
issue in Burns is the conclusion that Burns did not commit an
unfair labor practice by unilaterally changing the conditions of
employment by hiring former employees at a lower wage scale
than existed under the Wackenhut contract. The underlying
premise is that an employer is free to set initial terms of employment with its employees on an individual basis, unless the
employer owes a duty to bargain with a union or to honor an
existing contract. No unfair labor practice is established unless
these initial terms of employment are changed following the
time when Burns had a duty to bargain. Here, there simply
was no evidence to this effect.' 68 Burns' obligation to bargain
did not mature until it completed hiring its guard force, that is,
166. 406 U.S. 272, 295 (1972).
167. The only cases specifically testing this timing issue are inconclusive. See note 16 supra.
168.

406 U.S. 272, 293-96 (1972).
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after the initial terms of employment had been set individually
and Burns had no duty to honor the existing contract. Thus it
was free to set initial terms of employment without prior restrictions.
The difficulty with this line of reasoning is not its logic but
rather its application to future fact patterns. The precise point
at which the duty to bargain arises will undoubtedly vary according to the circumstances, but the Court provided no litmus
test and suggested no relevant criteria for measuring when the
breaking point is passed. This matter of timing, then, will
surely be the source of considerable instability in the law until
such a test is developed. This uncertainty is particularly troublesome since employer-union negotiations before actual succession would frequently alleviate possible industrial disputes at
the time of succession. But the employer is encouraged under
the present timing decision to delay completion of hiring as
long as possible, enhancing rather than mitigating employee
anxiety over the impending change in employer identity.
c. The Dissent
Itis appropriate here to test the rationale of the dissent on
these issues. Mr. Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the four dissenters, would not disregard as frivolous or insubstantial Burns'
argument that it possessed a good faith doubt as to the union's
continued majority. He stated that it was "by no means mathematically demonstrable that the union was the choice of a majority of the 42 employees with which Burns began the performance of its contract with Lockheed." 10 9 Indeed, the dissent would
seem to require a factual inquiry into the union sentiments of
the former employees retained in the surviving unit in each
case. But such a factual inquiry of individual union sentiment
would undermine the union's presumption of a continued majority during the certification year, thereby enhancing continued
tests of strength with each shift in employee sentiment. This
argument also disregards the fact that the union, upon certification, became the exclusive bargaining agent of all employees
in the unit, even those who voted against it in the election. A
majority of those employees represented by the union as commanded by the statute did in fact survive the employer change.
The Board rejected the employer's good faith doubt argument
and this finding was not clearly erroneous. As such, the Board's
169. 406 U.S. 272, 297 (1972).
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findings properly were sustained, even though the dissenters
might have reached a different result had they heard the case
de novo.
The dissent makes a more direct attack on the successorship finding in this case, arguing that the duty to bargain should
be imposed on the new employer only if there passed to Burns
some tangible or intangible assets by negotiation or transfer
from Wackenhut. 170 In support of this conclusion, three cases
are cited, all of which are easily distinguishable on their facts.
Tri State Maint. Corp. v. NLRB 171 involved the denial of successorship where the new employer hired 23 employees from the
former group of 40 but included these 23 employees in a new
unit of 70, so that a majority of the surviving unit was not composed of former employees. International Ass'n of Machinists,
Dist. Lodge 94 v. NLRB172 involved the division of one national
automobile distributorship into two separate, competing local
dealerships, neither of which retained in its employ a majority
7
of the former employees. Finally, Lincoln Private Police, Inc.' '
involved the formation of a new corporation by officers of the
former employer which hired 61 of its total 66 employees from
the former business but retained only 38% of the former employer's internal security jobs, the others being assumed by one
single business competitor. It is true that in each of these cases
assets were not interchanged between the new employer and its
predecessor, and this factor was strongly considered in the denial
of successorship. But in these cases, the factor mentioned above
placed the case within the framework of existing successorship
criteria or was an exception to those policies due to very unusual
circumstances.
In addition the dissent argued that the interests of all the
parties would have been served by a denial of successorship in
this case. The dissent asserted that the employees were denied
lateral movement between competitor employers by the Board's
imposition of a duty to bargain on the new employer. How is
this less true where the employer has no duty to bargain with
the union? Indeed, the employees are always free to leave the
employ of a particular employer, whether or not that employer
has a duty to bargain with the existing union. Even if the
170. 406 U.S. 272, 305-07 (1972).
171. 408 F.2d 171 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
172. 414 F.2d 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1969).

173. 189 N.L.R.B. No. 103, 76 L.R.R.M. 1727 (1971). The record is
silent as to the number of former employees hired by this other employer.
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employee's right to free movement was slightly impinged by
a duty to bargain, his rights within the contract (though not
binding on the successor) are far more important to the individual employee where he has a job that he wants to retainAccording to the dissent, the new employer is disadvantaged to
the extent it has to bargain with a union without a showing of
majority membership. But if that duty extends to the new employer only when the employer retains sufficient numbers of the
former unit as to constitute a majority in the surviving employee group, it is difficult to envision prejudice to the successor
where the bargaining duty flows from its own decision to retain these employees. Finally, the dissent asserts that the prime
contractor's interests may be adversely affected by the imposition of a duty to bargain on the successor, but this is not any
different from the case where a new union demands recognition
upon a showing of a majority membership in an appropriate unit
within the contractor's domain.
The dissent concluded by asserting that the imposition of
the duty to bargain under the facts in Burns places undue rigidity upon the labor relations in the job. Quite the contrary seems
to be true. The duty to bargain permits each of the interested
parties to assert its claims to the maximum extent thought desirable by the parties, thereby insuring maximum flexibility for
each party while enhancing the opportunities for peaceful settlement of any disputes which arise. In the end, the arguments
made by the dissent are neither supported by the authority cited
nor persuasive in logic.
3. Burns and Wiley Compared
The starting point for considering the issue of contract survival must be the provision of section 8 (d) of the Act which excludes from the duty to bargain in good faith "[compelling] either party to agree to a [proposal] or [requiring] the making of
a concession." A comparison of the facts and rationale of
Wiley with those of Burns places section 8 (d) in its proper role
in the contract Survival context. It will be recalled that Wiley
involved a merger in the context of a suit to compel successor
arbitration under the former employer's contract in which the
employees of the small, former employer were integrated into
the large, unorganized, employee complement. The Court ordered arbitration based upon the strong preference for grievance
arbitration as a continuation of the collective bargaining process,
as an agreed upon method of resolving disputes by the parties,
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and as an effectuation of the national labor objective of industrial peace.
The Burns Court distinguished Wiley by saying that Wiley
"held only that the agreement to arbitrate ... survived the

merger and left to the arbitrator, subject to judicial review, the
ultimate question of the extent to which, if any, the surviving
company was bound by other provisions of the contract."' 1'7
Further, the Court strongly implied that 8(d) is inapplicable to
arbitration cases. Finally, the Court found Burns distinguishable from Wiley in that the
present case does not involve a § 301 suit; nor does it involve
the duty to arbitrate. Rather, the claim is that Burns must be
held bound by the contract executed by Wackenhut, whether
Burns has agreed to it or not and even though Burns made it
perfectly clear that it had no intention of assuming that contract. Wiley suggests no such open-ended obligation. Its narrower holding dealt with a merger occurring against a background of state law that embodied the general rule that in
merger situations the surviving corporation is liable for the obligations of the disappearing corporation ....
Burns merely
hired enough of Wackenhut's employees to require it to bargain .... But this consideration is a wholly insufficient basis
for implying either in fact or in law that Burns had agreed or
must be held to have 75
agreed to honor Wackenhut's collectivebargaining agreement.'
These distinctions seem wholly unpersuasive. To be sure,
the Wiley order to arbitrate does not automatically carry with it
other substantive terms of the former collective bargaining
agreement. However, as was seen earlier, 170 the practical effect
of the order to arbitrate usually leads the parties to resolve
their disputes without resort to formal arbitration. But where
arbitration is held, the arbitrator somehow finds that the contract survived in its entirety, relying upon Wiley for support of
this conclusion. The protection of judicial review is of little consequence where the scope of that review is as narrowly drawn
as is review of arbitral awards. Indeed, if Burns had arisen as a
suit to compel arbitration, under Wiley's very broad continuity
standard, arbitration would clearly have been compelled. In
fact, Burns is an a fortiori case for continuity since a competitive bid situation compels continuation of the existing "employing industry," assuming that the present invitation does not ma-

terially alter the terms of prior invitations. Further, in the light
of the arbitral experience under Wiley, contract survival in
174. 406 U.S. 272, 285-86 (1972).
175. 406 U.S. 272, 286-87 (1972).
176. See text accompanying notes 125-141 supra.
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Burns would be virtually assured. 77 Thus for the Court to find
this purely analytical distinction controlling in the face of that
experience is to elevate form over substance with the ultimate
result on the merits largely dependent upon the union's choice
of forums. Such a result is indeed anomalous.
Equally unpersuasive is the Court's legalistic assertion that
section 8(d) does not apply to arbitration. Again, that conclusion analytically may be entirely correct, for section 8(d) purports only to define the scope of good faith bargaining, and not
to reach the content of particular provisions within the consumated agreement. If it means anything at all, however, the policy of section 8(d) favors the consensual meeting of the minds
of the parties. It substitutes arms-length bargaining and voluntary agreement for industrial strife or officially imposed terms
and conditions of employment dictated from an agency outside
the employment relationship. Indeed, the policy is based on the
proposition that in labor disputes each side is best able to judge
its own priorities, to make its own quantitative judgments, and
to evaluate the relative strengths and weaknesses of the other
side to its own advantage. In its wisdom Congress opted for a
regulatory scheme requiring collective bargaining but compelling no particular content to the agreement reached. At the
heart of this scheme of collective bargaining is grievance arbitration, which the Court envisions as the ultimate embodiment
of the continuing collective bargaining process. Therefore, to
hold that the statutory limitation of section 8(d) is inapplicable
to arbitration is to permit indirectly what the Congress prohibits directly.
It should be noted, however, that not every case presents this
anomaly, since Burns did not hold that no successor employer
can ever be compelled to honor the substantive terms of his
predecessor's contract. Indeed, the Court implied that the con177. See notes 126, 133 supra. If the results are so assured, one
wonders why the union did not pursue this course in Burns. Perhaps
it viewed the unfair labor practice course of action as more expeditious.
Indeed, if full resort to judicial review is made, the unfair labor practice is decided in the Board with review in the court of appeals and in
the Supreme Court. On the other hand, a suit to compel arbitration begins in the district court with review in the court of appeals and the
Supreme Court, then the case is returned to the arbitrator on the merits with suits to enforce the award in the district court with review in
the court of appeals and the Supreme Court. On the other hand, perhaps the union viewed the results on the merits as not absolutely assured in arbitration, since no case compelling arbitration exists where
the form of succession was by competitive bid rather than by some
form of purchase.

1100

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:1051

tract survives where the employer affirmatively assumes it or
where "in a variety of circumstances involving a merger, stock
acquisition, reorganization, or assets purchase, the Board might
properly find as a matter of fact that the successor had assumed
the obligations ....
'178 What the Court held, therefore, is that
such a duty does not "ensue as a matter of law from the mere
fact than [sic] an employer is doing the same work in the same
place with the same employees as his predecessor. ' 179
Despite constant affirmations to the contrary, this language
suggests that in the area of contract assumption, as was apparently true in the successor's duty to remedy his predecessor's
unfair labor practices, the form of succession may significantly
affect, indeed may control, the ultimate result. In that context,
if Burns had arisen as a question of the successor's duty to remedy existing unfair labor practices of Wackenhut, the results of
successorship would have been denied since Burns was not a
purchaser (even though it may have had knowledge of the unresolved misconduct), 80 The opposite result would require a
nonconsenting successor to correct the misconduct of a business
competitor. In addition, this would discourage and undermine
the wholesome objectives of competitive bidding as effectively
as the existence of possible litigation discourages the purchase of
any physical asset. No employer wants to inherit labor difficulties with the NLRB, even if appropriate adjustments in the
bid could be made to avoid a financial loss, anymore than any
person desires to "buy a lawsuit."
Perhaps a similar rationale might be appropriate where the
question involves inheriting preexisting contract provisions of a
substantive nature which would control the future relations of
the parties. The application of a rule which mechanically imposes upon the successor the predecessor's contract would discourage competitive bidding, tending thereby to entrench the
predecessor. This would place in the hands of the existing contractor a tool for abuse, both against his competitor-employers
and against the union. If, for example, the existing employer
decided not to submit a bid in response to the present invitation,
it could agree to outrageous terms with the union, without the
knowledge of the other bidders or at a time when amendments
to the bids would be impermissible. Of course, if the bids could
be withdrawn or amended and if the bidders knew of the agree178.
179.

406 U.S. 272, 291 (1972) (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).

180. See text accompanying notes 91-113 supra.
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ment, they could choose not to compete for the bid or withdraw
the bid in recognition of its probable impact. But if the bidders
had no knowledge, then the mechanical application of contract
survival could do irreparable injury to the winner. Either way,
competitive bidding would be thwarted. This, of course, completely distorts the proper role of the collective bargaining
agreement to the detriment of all concerned, enhancing rather
than mitigating the chances for industrial strife.
The Court's reliance upon the "background of state law" of
mergers to distinguish Wiley is particularly disturbing and
wholly misplaced. Wiley itself expressly rejected consideration
of state law as having any bearing whatsoever upon the duties
of successors under the national labor policies. Further, utilization of state law as a criterion to determine the scope of employer duties arising under national labor policy would be a
dramatic departure from a long and studied preemption of state
law where the national statutory scheme applies.
The apparent result of the Burns reasoning, then, is that if
the new employer expressly or by its conduct manifests a clear
intent not to be bound by the predecessor's contract, the new
employer is not bound thereby.1 81 The Board's pre-Burns rule is
therefore revived. It will be recalled that an examination of intent was also found in Wiley, where the Court suggested as a
standard for the arbitrator an examination on the merits of the
intent of the parties as reflected by the collective bargaining
agreement. There is a significant and crucial difference, however, for the intent to be ascertained under Wiley was that of
the former employer and the union, while the manifestation of
intent searched for in Burns was that of the successor without
regard to the expressed intent of the parties to the preexisting
collective bargaining agreement. Indeed, if section 9(d) is to be
given any effect, it is the successor's intent which must control,
for it is the future employment relationship of the successor and
the union which is sought to be controlled by the preexisting
contract.
It should be noted that section 8(d) is in no way limited
to the case of a merger, reorganization, or assets purchase. The
181. Compare Monroe Sander Corp. v. Livingston, 377 F.2d 6 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967), with United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 335 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964), both of which involved a duty to arbitrate in a purchase of assets context, even though
the successor expressly manifested an intent not to be bound by the
predecessor's labor contract. See generally the cases cited note 60
supra.
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same conclusion must apply regardless of the method by which
the succession takes place, though it is assuredly much easier
to find a manifestation of intent in fact in such situations.
By reading Wiley and Burns together and giving vitality to
each, the conclusion seems inescapable that the substantive terms
of the contract survive, whether by decision of the arbitrator
or the NLRB, only if the successor in word or deed manifests
an intent to be bound thereby. A different result in the face of
section 8(d) is untenable. Yet this conclusion does not disregard the interests of the employees. True, their contract does
not survive automatically, but it provides a basis against which
the employer-employee dialogue can be measured. Further,
even though their contract does not survive, there is more employer incentive to retain the individual employee already
trained to do the job where the employer has a hand in shaping
the content of the ongoing employment relationship than where
the terms of the relationship are dictated by the predecessor (in
this case by a competitor). Indeed, such a conclusion seems calculated to minimize industrial strife by placing the parties at the
bargaining table to work out their differences in an atmosphere
of good faith bargaining, while at the same time maximizing
protection for free choice, not just for the former employees but
for all parties to the new employment relationship.
IV. CONCLUSION
The notion of employer successorship in labor relations embodies an inherent tension underlying much of the law. On the
surface there are the competing interests represented by the employer's quest for profit through economic efficiency and the
employee's search for higher wages, better working conditions,
and job security. Underlying each particular dispute are the
conflicting national labor objectives of maximizing freedom of
choice while minimizing industrial strife. More generally, successorship illustrates the law's search for a balanced regulatory
scheme which permits the development of easily administered,
mechanical tests within a framework of individual justice; an
excess of the former achieves efficiency at the expense of rigidity, while an excess of the latter purchases case-by-case flexibility at the price of diminished uniformity. No concept of fundamental fairness can be developed which fails to strike an equitable balance between the various competing and conflicting interests at issue. Such is the task of the doctrine of employer successorship.
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As this Article attempts to reveal, it is inherently confusing
and factually inaccurate to label successorship with the title
"doctrine," suggesting a logically consistent, explicitly defined
set of facts or a universally applicable set of standards, policies,
and purposes. The successorship inquiry is merely questionbegging, that is, under the particular facts presented, would the
underlying objectives of the Act be best achieved by holding the
new employer obligated to fulfill some or all of the labor obligations of the former employer? Such a general inquiry, however, suggests a complete absence of basic criteria against which
each case is to be measured. Thus the concept of successorship
arose to fill this apparent void.
As has been illustrated, the issue of employer successorship
arises out of a seemingly endless variety of factual settings with
each new case presenting some of the factors considered relevant
to the resolution of prior cases while raising other materially
altered, entirely omitted, or newly-added facts which arguably
should affect the decision on the merits. Surely much of the
confusion which attends successorship is the facility with which
each case is distinguishable on its facts from all former cases.
However, to dismiss the confusion so lightly would be to
compound it by oversimplification, for such a conclusion would
wholly disregard the fundamental differences inherent in the
various legal contexts in which the issue arises. For example,
the basic policies which underlie successorship for bargaining
purposes are certainly different than the objectives sought to
be satisfied when the issue is the successor's duty to remedy
preexisting unresolved unfair labor practices committed by the
predecessor. In the bargaining context, a former employee majority in the surviving work force and a continuity of the former
employee unit are absolutely essential to the imposition of a
duty to bargain. On the other hand, a reinstatement with back
pay order against the successor with regard to a particular individual discriminatorily discharged by the predecessor may not
call for either continuity of employee composition or unit. Successorship for arbitration purposes may be designed either to adjust disputes as to vested rights having accrued at the time of
succession, or to determine the survival of substantive duties affecting the plenary, prospective relationship of the successor with
the union and the employees. Prospective protection for employee free choice is quite different than remedying past misconduct based on a concept of unjust enrichment. The frequent
failure of the decision-making bodies to distinguish between the
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underlying policy objectives inherent in the different legal contexts in which the issue of successorship arises has led to utilization of criteria relevant for one purpose but neutral or contrary to the objectives of the other. Clear thinking, rational consistency, and elimination of confusion demand the Court's recognition of the nature of the successorship issue raised and assessment of the objectives served by the resolution of it.
A large, though not altogether satisfactory, step in this direction was taken by the Court in Burns. The Court charted a
more evenly balanced accommodation between free choice and
industrial peace by denying the imposition of substantive, prospectively applicable contract provisions upon a non-consenting
successor. The Court affirmatively required both the arbitral
inquiry mandated by Wiley and Board inquiry in the unfair labor practice context to focus on factual affirmations of the successor's assent, either by word or by deed, prior to ordering the
successor bound substantively by a preexisting collective bargaining agreement. Finally, the Court reaffirmed the existing
policy of ad hoc evolution of general criteria applicable to successorship in these and other contexts. Therein lies Burns'
greatest wisdom and, perhaps, its most telling weakness, for it
permits the widest possible flexibility in the face of constantly
changing factual patterns, but at the same time it diminishes
predictability in an area of the law where predictable consequences are exceedingly desirable. Whether employer successorship will rise out of the morass of confusion with which it has
long been plagued through the helping hand from Burns will
be left to the constantly unfolding process of development which
constitutes the common law.

